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This thesis investigates the interplay between fictionality and verisimilitude in fiction 
written between 1638 and 1835. Specifically, it examines the epistemic complications that arise 
when a single text juxtaposes “factual” and “fictional” discourses. With this in mind, it adopts as 
its test case the lunar travel narrative (LTN), a genre that exemplifies fiction attempting to 
masquerade as fact. In lunar travel narratives, narrators describe traveling to the moon before this 
journey was possible, and employ the seemingly-reliable discourse of empiricism in order to 
bolster their claims. This juxtaposition does not result merely in a clash between opposing 
discourses, but allows them to invade each other in uncomfortable ways. This invasion gives rise 
to generically indeterminate texts which exist somewhere between categories of fact and fiction 
and disrupt the mutually exclusive binary we imagine to be self-evident. Such blurring also 
challenges the received view of literature and science as independent, mutually exclusive 
projects. I critique this positivist view of “self-evident” categories of fact/fiction and 
literature/science by demonstrating how LTNs reveal scientific discourse to function using 
certain fictive literary elements. I also examine how these texts employ their indeterminate status 
to undermine established associations between the formal signature of empirical discourse and 
the assumed truth value of its content.  
In my Introduction, I establish my aims and methods and also my contribution to the 
critical conversation. In Chapter One, I introduce the discourses that interact to generate LTNs’ 
indeterminacy, and I reveal how each discourse incorporates both factual and fictive elements on 
its own. In Chapter Two, I demonstrate that when these discourses meet for the first time in a 
single text, that text becomes indeterminate, existing somewhere between fact and fiction. This 
indeterminacy spread to other works and became a generic constant. Chapter Three considers 
how the Royal Society systematized empirical discourse into its normative “plain style” and how 
this development re-situated the indeterminacy of the LTN, making its genre instabilities seem to 
satirize the narratives’ own scientific discourse. Chapter Four traces LTNs’ attempt to regain 
stability by separating their factual and fictive discourses into text and context. My examination 
ends as the LTN’s increasingly subversive critique is quarantined within modern science fiction. 
My conclusion compares the LTN to the novel and considers how the history of the LTN, extinct 
by the 20th century, highlights aspects of the novel, and the robustness of that form up through 
the present. 
Throughout my chapters, I discuss works by numerous authors, including Lucian, Kepler, 
Godwin, de Bergerac, Wilkins, Russen, Defoe, McDermot, Brunt, Poe, Locke, and Verne. I have 
selected these particular LTNs for their pronounced or problematic use of scientific discourse. 
By studying the contradictions and paradoxes of fictionality and verisimilitude that arise in these 
works, I hope to assemble a kind of fossil record from which we may read an evolutionary 
history of a developing discourse, one that generates a variety of literary genres and styles as 
well as the divide between the disciplines of science and literary studies, with a culmination that 
is intrinsically related to the emergence of the modern novel. Because we live in a world derived 
from the forms, values, and categories that solidified during these centuries of discursive 
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“One last feature unites science and literature, but this feature is also the one which divides 
them more certainly than any other difference: both are discourses...” 
- Roland Barthes, “From Science to Literature,” The Rustle of Language, p.4 
 
Has the novel always been as believable as we now perceive it to be? Certain critics like 
Ian Watt would affirm that it has. In The Rise of the Novel, Watt claims that the genre has been 
defined from the start by an emphasis on verisimilitude, “likeness or resemblance to truth, 
reality, or fact” (“verisimilitude, n.”). He dubs this defining feature of the novel “formal 
realism,” so named because it “does not reside in the kind of life [the novel] presents, but in the 
way it presents it” (Watt 32, 11). However, this analysis has prompted further questioning and 
led other critics to hypothesize more complicated origins for the genre. In “The Rise of 
Fictionality,” Catherine Gallagher claims that it is not verisimilitude but “fictionality,” her term 
encompassing the quality of literary fictiveness, that is the novel’s defining feature. This claim 
necessitates a more complicated generic genesis, and Gallagher delivers, describing how "from 
the outset, novelistic fictionality has been unique and paradoxical" (337). She claims that the 
novel “is said both to have discovered and to have obscured fiction," and sees the invention of 
“believable stories that did not solicit belief” as crucial to its development (Gallagher 338, 340).  
The question that animates this project starts with the inverse of Gallagher’s formulation, 
pondering unbelievable stories that do solicit belief. What happens when these paradoxes of 
verisimilitude and fictionality are not obscured, as in the novel, but showcased? Investigating 
such an alternative will not only shed light on the way in which the novel mediates a synthesis of 




which such textual features interact in other varieties of writing.  
By undertaking such an inquiry, this thesis aims to sketch the complex epistemic issues 
arising from the interplay between fictionality and verisimilitude in fiction written between 1630 
and 1835. Specifically, it will analyze how these issues arise in the interactions between various 
discourses, which in my usage specifies recognizable writing styles associated with a particular 
genre. To this end, I will examine fictions that purport to be facts, or in the words of Francis 
Bacon, “so strange things so probably told” (25). I will draw my texts from a genre that at the 
time served as the best example of fiction claiming to be fact: namely, the lunar travel narrative 
(LTN), a type of story in which a first-person participant-narrator describes traveling to the moon 
at a time when, of course, this journey was technologically impossible. The narrator of and in 
these fictions always finds the moon to be inhabited, often by humanoid creatures with whom he 
can communicate. The pertinent scholarship rarely regards the LTN as more than a quirky 
offshoot of the travel narrative genre or as an example of nascent science fiction. These stories, 
however, exhibit two characteristics, the combination of which makes them the perfect test case 
for an inquiry into issues of discourse, fictionality, and epistemology. The LTN is distinguished 
by its status as an epistemic failure, and by its unique discursive hybridity. 
Like many other fictional travel narratives, LTNs use a rhetoric of verisimilitude that 
aims to elicit belief; however, these texts are unique in that they fail in an obvious, even 
spectacular way at this endeavor. Their rhetorical ploys are both transparent and empty, and they 
appeared so to contemporary readers. Percy G. Adams, a critic of travel accounts, says as much 
when he asserts that “[t]he lunar literature [was] not intended to fool the general reader” (81). 
However, this failure to convince generates consequences in the realm of epistemology, the 




(Steup). The lunar setting of LTNs highlights each story’s fictional status, stripping its rhetorical 
maneuvers of any real power to convince. Verisimilar suspension of disbelief, like that generated 
by the novel, becomes impossible to sustain. Like oil and water, the rhetorical conventions and 
the content to which these refer inevitably separate within the text. The belief-seeking agendas of 
these structures stand out in high contrast to the tales’ frankly fictive content in a way that is 
obscured in texts with more plausible content. Such epistemic consequences are rarely 
encountered in other forms of fiction, and they distinguish the LTN as being of particular interest 
to students of discourse, truth claims, and believability. 
LTNs also differ from other narrative genres with respect to their discursive hybridity, a 
characteristic that historicizes the epistemic complexity mentioned above. Dating from the 
second century CE, the earliest LTN establishes the genre as a form of mimetic satire aimed at 
discrediting the claims of travel narratives. However, when LTNs re-emerged as a popular genre 
in England in the mid-1630s, the scientific revolution was well under way. Therefore, their 
explanations of their lunar subject matter were heavily implicated in the development of 
empiricism, an epistemic trend holding that knowledge arises strictly from unmediated sensory 
experience and therefore relies on firsthand observation or experimentation for validity 
(“empiricism, n.”). This dual heritage generates the genre’s discursive paradoxes: stories which 
incorporate travel narratives’ discourse evolve to incorporate the experimental and experiential 
language of empiricism as it enters into that discourse. Critic Jenny Mezciems describes this shift 
as occurring in the 18th century, when “romance in travel…[begins to follow] the criteria of 
scientific reality, so that spurious narratives ape the new manner of real ones, and fiction 
pretends to be fact in a new way” (15). In this century, the object of LTNs’ satires switches from 




belief in fictions in the same way that travel narrative discourse originally did. Because of the 
genre’s uniquely bifurcated literary genealogy, it offers rare historical insight into the 
development and interactions of various specialized discourses. 
By synthesizing categories modern readers likely perceive as polar opposites, LTNs also 
disrupt categorical thinking and yield texts of varyingly indeterminate status. I use the term 
“indeterminate” to refer to texts that resist received binaries of factual/fictional, serious/satirical, 
and even scientific/literary. This resistance is a byproduct of the doubleness of their genealogy, 
which leads them to manifest qualities of each term. The phenomenon of such indeterminate 
texts suggests that in the long 18th century, these categories had not yet settled into the mutually 
exclusive binaries that we take to be self-evident, but that they were (and still are) dependent on 
culturally constructed discursive differences. This categorical ambiguity is a crucial feature in 
the epistemological infrastructure of these texts. As Michael McKeon notes, “The instability of 
generic categories registers an epistemological crisis, a major cultural transition in attitudes 
toward how to tell the truth in narrative” (“Generic” 383). By studying contradictions and 
paradoxes of fictionality and verisimilitude in LTNs, I hope to produce a kind of fossil record 
from which we may read the evolutionary history of a developing discourse, one that generates a 
variety of literary genres and styles as well as the divide between the fields of science and 
literary studies, with a culmination intrinsically related to the emergence of the novel. 
Before I map the terrain that the following chapters will cover, I wish to introduce two 
caveats and a convenient taxonomic system. As I indicated, my thesis uses LTNs as a test case in 
order to research how believability claims in fiction shifted over time in response to historical 
developments in scientific culture, particularly the scientific revolution and the establishment of 




genre; in that vein, other scholarly works exist which fill this niche to capacity.1 While the 
questions I contend with in my thesis arise in relationship to genre, they are more foundational, 
more epistemic, and more historically oriented than the available critical literature, focusing on 
form rather than content, but using each to inform the other.  
I wish to offer one more caveat before opening onto my analysis. Instead of a reception 
history focused on recoverable evidence of whether or not contemporary readers of LTNs 
actually believed the texts’ claims, this thesis develops a history of forms and rhetorical devices, 
analyzing the claims that the texts themselves make, regardless of reception.  
When discussing literary evolution over long stretches of history, it is useful to have a set 
of benchmark terms that can help calibrate gradual literary change. In History of the Novel: A 
Historical Approach, Michael McKeon identifies three phases through which the novel 
progressed when maturing into its modern form. “Idealized romanticism,” he argues, is first 
opposed by “naïve empiricism,” which is then in turn opposed by “extreme skepticism” 
(McKeon History 384). All three of these kinds of fiction eventually combine to generate the 
genre we find familiar today. These categories work surprisingly well for describing the changes 
that the LTN undergoes in response to scientific development in the 18th century. Accordingly, 
this thesis will employ McKeon’s schema in order to provide a structural taxonomy for primary 
texts and a vocabulary for describing and analyzing processes of gradual literary change. “Naïve 
empiricism” will be used in reference to texts that use empirical rhetoric without satirically 
critiquing it, while “extreme skepticism” will refer to the texts of a later period in which this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For those seeking overviews of the genre, I recommend Marjorie Hope Nicholson’s 1948 Voyages to the 
Moon, a well-researched history of the LTN, and Aaron Parrett’s 2004 The Translunar Narrative in the 




critique is present. These categories develop in the LTN in much the same pattern that McKeon 
identifies in the novel, suggesting that the two genres may share other features. 
My chapters are organized chronologically so as to track the literary and cultural 
developments that form the crux of my investigation. My first chapter lays out the two discourses 
that ground the 18th-century LTN’s epistemic conflict, in that each discourse exhibits epistemic 
complexities on its own. I open with the satirical mimicry of ancient travel narratives found in 
the first LTN, Lucian’s True History (2nd century CE). Then, a discussion of empiricism provides 
the backdrop for analyzing empirical discourse in Johannes Kepler’s Conversation with the 
Starry Messenger (1610) and Somnium (1630).  
In Chapter Two, I trace these discourses and demonstrate the complications that occur 
when they intersect for the first time in a single work, the first English LTN, Francis Godwin’s 
The Man in the Moone (1638). Brief analyses of references to Godwin in Cyrano de Bergerac’s 
Voyage dans la Lune (1657) and the second edition of Bishop Wilkins’ Discovery of a World in 
the Moone (1640) demonstrate that while writers sought to disaggregate factual and fictive 
dimensions, the two rhetorics had invaded each other, becoming impossible to separate. 
Chapter Three analyzes how this indeterminacy was amplified by the Royal Society’s 
codification of empirical discourse. Adopting this discourse led LTNs to become self-reflexive 
and self-implicating in their satirical attacks, resulting in a textual instability which I track 
through David Russen’s Iter Lunare, or A Trip to the Moon (1703), Daniel Defoe’s The 
Consolidator (1705), and Murtagh McDermot’s A Trip to the Moon (1728). Such an unstable 
genre could not last, and in my final chapter, I sketch out the conclusion of the LTN’s role as 




envision Richard Adams Locke’s Moon Hoax of 1835 as a turning point in the LTN’s 
development, and use Samuel Brunt’s A Voyage to Cacklogallinia (1727), two editions of Edgar 
Allan Poe’s Hans Pfaall--A Tale (1835 and 1840), and Jules Verne’s From the Earth to the 
Moon Direct in Ninety-Seven Hours and Twenty Minutes, and a Trip Round It (1874) as 
touchstone instances of the LTN’s generic subsidence and the hoax’s substantial effect on it. In 
my conclusion, I consider parallels between the LTN and the novel and offer some conjectures 
about the relationship between the genres and why they met such different fates.  
Mary Baine Campbell has said that “openly imaginary voyages [are] an obvious resource 
for the project of anthropology” (“Impossible” 1), and it is not a great stretch to suggest that 
these texts are similarly valuable within the fields of literary studies and the history of science. I 
envision my thesis as investigating the overlap between these two fields and their accompanying 
perspectives. I also see it as examining the interaction between texts’ formal elements and 
historical contexts. Too often, these factors are isolated from each other – or so the popular 
division between formalists and historicists so-called might have one believe. This thesis 
explores new territory by not only investigating the point where these critical perspectives 
intersect, but by investigating the grey area implied but not explored in many modern binaries, 
and doing so through analysis of a genre perfectly suited to the task but largely ignored in our 
literary criticism. As Mezciems notes, “As long as new emphases and experiences are presented 
through old forms…they continue to be related to old values in spite of themselves, and to be 
constrained by the very vehicles through which they seek acceptance” (Mezciems 10). We are 
living in a world derived from the forms, values, and categories that solidified because of 
discursive developments, so it is worth our while to investigate the process by which this 




Chapter One: Mixing Fact and Fiction in Two Discursive Traditions 
The paradoxes that characterize lunar travel narratives (LTNs) stem from a mismatch of 
two distinct discourses or styles of writing: the trusted experiential language of empiricism, and 
the suspicion-inducing claims of travel accounts. In the early 17th century, each of these 
discourses found the moon to be a topic of interest: Galileo wrote about observing it with his 
new telescope in 1610, and it was also tied to the genre of travel narratives, accounts notorious in 
the day for their ability to lie about exotic locales. The texts discussed in this chapter all predate 
the first English LTN’s publication in 1634; however, analyzing them provides the context in 
which to discuss the significance of this work, the first point at which these discourses of 
empiricism and travel narratives appear in a single text and begin to generate epistemic and 
discursive complications. In preparation for analyzing this intersection, this chapter examines 
texts that exemplify each of these discourses in order to introduce them and characterize their 
similarities and differences.  
Readers, imagining a binary of empirical fact facing travel narratives’ ostentatious 
fiction, might expect the differences between these discourses to outnumber their similarities. 
My reading complicates this assumed simplicity, showing instead that each discourse 
incorporates both factual and fictive elements, and that the empirical style relies as much on 
imaginative speculation as imaginary travel accounts rely upon factual details. Seeing that each 
of the LTN’s two formative discourses is a mixture of factual and fictive elements will help to 






“I confidently pronounce for a truth, that I lie”2: LTNs as Satirical Puzzles 
Debates about textual believability did not of course originate in the 18th century; we 
find instances in the 2nd century CE, and from these we can deduce a crucial environment 
enabling the emergence of one of the first LTNs, True History.3 This text aims to entertain while 
exposing and critiquing travel narratives’ attempts to elicit belief by using proto-empirical 
discourse. Examining this debate and True History’s place in it will ensure that readers can 
identify how later LTNs reprise similar methods to critique a different discourse. 
One of the texts at the center of the ancient debate about textual believability was 
Herodotus’ Histories. While this account of the Persian Wars led to its author being called “The 
Father of History,” it also relates numerous details that are problematically fictional, such as 
giant gold-digging ants, the bones of flying snakes, and sheep whose tails are so big they cannot 
move without the help of wooden wagons (Herodotus 3.102-105, 2.75, 3.113). “[Herodotus] 
loves a good story and recounts thõmata, astounding facts,” notes critic Carolyn Dewald (xviii). 
However, she also emphasizes that “Herodotus himself does not expect us to believe everything 
we read,” indicating a passage where he remarks, “I am obliged to record the things I am told, 
but I am certainly not required to believe them—this remark may be taken to apply to the whole 
of my account” (Dewald xxviii, Herodotus 7.152). While Herodotus directly performs his 
skepticism by interrupting his narrative in this manner, he elsewhere attempts to elicit belief. He 
occasionally “tell[s] us directly about efforts he has made to ferret out or investigate a particular 
problem, including eyewitness investigation (opsis)” (Dewald xxx). An ancestor of the genre of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Lucian 7 
3 The other LTN that may be considered the first is Icaromenippus. Also written by Lucian sometime 





travel writing, Herodotus’ Histories mixes factual and fictive elements, and its narrator performs 
the appropriate responses so that the account may appear plausible overall.  
Hearing stories that combined factual and fictive elements “would have seemed 
natural…to Herodotus’ fifth-century…audiences as the normal way to hear about things from the 
past (it was the way Homer did it, after all)” (Dewald xxvii). However, Herodotus’ innovation of 
attempting to elicit belief and doubt in different parts of a single text left many readers skeptical 
of the work as a whole; Thucydides, Aristophanes, Ctesias, Plutarch, and Cicero all doubted the 
authenticity of its claims (Dewald xxxi). Cicero criticized it for its fictive elements by calling it a 
work “full of legends,” while Ctesias took it upon himself to “[write] a Persian history that 
systematically contradicted Herodotus’ version of events” (Dewald xxxi); this led to his 
reception as a figure “[whose] unreliability makes Herodotus seem a model of accuracy” (Barker 
9). The skeptical reception of The Histories hasn’t yet subsided, as “[s]ome scholars…have come 
to the conclusion not merely that it is unhistorical, but that it was intended by Herodotus to 
mislead us by persuading us through its rhetoric to read it as history” (Dewald xxxiii).  
Whether or not The Histories aims to mislead, its use of rhetoric to elicit belief is what 
one of the first LTNs, True History, sets out to expose. Written by Lucian of Samosata in the 2nd 
century CE, the work disrupts its own narrative coherence in order to expose the veneer of 
reliability generated by travel narratives’ discourse and rhetoric. The text emphasizes its logical 
rupture with humor in order to amplify its criticism; after all, what better way to make audiences 
devalue a serious text than by making it laughable? Along with humor, Lucian underscores his 
opposing logical positions with different styles of writing: one works to make his text seem true 
by emphasizing verisimilar details, the other emphasizes its fictionality by mimicking the 




to another, as by mimicking travel narratives’ attempted verisimilitude while also declaiming 
those tales as lies, Lucian satirically demonstrates the emptiness of travel narratives’ claims. 
Lucian’s introduction lays the foundation for his satire, specifying its target as “the old 
poets, historiographers, and philosophers, [who] in their writings have recorded many monstrous 
and intolerable untruths” (4). Of these, Lucian’s narrator is especially critical of travel narratives, 
complaining that the unreliable historiographer Ctesias “wrote of the region of the Indians and 
the state of those countries, matters which he neither saw himself, nor ever heard from the mouth 
of any man” (5). He also implicates Homer’s Odyssey as the first problematic travel narrative: 
 …the first father and founder of all this foolery was Homer's Ulysses, who tells a 
long tale to Alcinous of the servitude of the winds, and of wild men with one eye 
in their foreheads that fed upon raw flesh, of beasts with many heads, and the 
transformation of his friends by enchanted potions, all which he made the silly 
Phaeakes believe for great sooth. (Lucian 5-6) 
 
 
Today’s readers may be surprised to encounter a fictional text at the heart of a complaint 
concerning narrative believability. However, Lucian is right to recognize both fact and fiction in 
Homer’s work; modern critics like Herman Strasburger have since recognized “how much 
genuine historical impulse is to be found…in Homer” (Dewald xxxii), but his works also include 
fictional elements like those Lucian harangues above. The Odyssey is a fiction that includes 
historical details, just as Herodotus’ Histories is a history that includes fictional elements. 
Though they may be categorized differently today, Lucian critiques both travel narratives and 
epics because they each involve fictional elements and masquerade as truthful in some capacity. 
True History grounds its satire in a logical paradox formed when its two narrators elicit 
different interpretations of its story. The introduction’s narrator claims that the work is a fictional 




that his account is historically accurate. Lucian uses this paradox to satirize travel narratives by 
characterizing their work as humorously self-contradictory, just like his own. The paradox begins 
to emerge at the end of the introduction, when its narrator declares that he intends to lie: 
…I turned my style to publish untruths, but with an honester mind than others 
have done: for this one thing I confidently pronounce for a truth, that I lie…I 
write of matters which I neither saw nor suffered, nor heard by report from others, 
which are in no being, nor possible ever to have a beginning. Let no man 
therefore in any case give any credit to them. (Lucian 7) 
 
 
The passage’s length, its placement at the end of the introduction, and its emphatic repetition of 
the narrator’s intentions establish the story that follows as overtly fictional in the reader’s mind.  
Throughout the body of the text, the narrator contradicts his blatant intention to lie by 
assuring readers that they are hearing the absolute truth. This generates logical problems, such as 
when the narrator claims to observe a form of purgatory and notes that “the greatest torments of 
all are inflicted upon them that told any lies in their lifetime, and wrote untruly, as Ctesias the 
Cnidian, Herodotus, and many other[s]…” (Lucian 95). Evoking the introduction, which 
attacked Ctesias in particular, these lines encourage a fictional reading of the text. However, the 
narrator elicits another interpretation as he continues, remarking, “…which I beholding, was put 
in great hopes that I should never have anything to do there, for I do not know that ever I spake 
any untruth in my life” (Lucian 95). Because of the strained emphasis Lucian’s narrator first 
places on the work’s mendacity, and later on its veracity, the reader sees the contradiction as 
deliberate and humorous, rather than as an unwitting defect in the text’s internal logic. 	  
Lucian’s humor isolates and explores the standoff between fictive and factual readings of 
the text, revealing the workings of its truth claims. It raises serious logical and epistemic 




element of reflexivity. It evokes the problem of the Cretan liar, the Cretan who declares that “all 
Cretans are liars,” creating a self-referential paradox. By arranging such a paradox between 
factual and fictive readings and embedding it in his narrative, Lucian amplifies his critique by 
creating a puzzle that disrupts the narrative’s stability, ensuring that readers can’t ignore it. This 
paradox is only humorous in that its categories do not mingle, but rather remain separate and 
clashing. The text is witty because it says one thing and then another, not because it exists in 
some sort of indeterminate middle space as later LTNs do. 
Lucian uses humor to underscore his logical paradox, and also emphasizes it by 
employing within his narrative discursive modes that evoke both factual and fictive sources. This 
manipulation of discourse is consciously effected, as the introduction demonstrates by describing 
the work as consisting of “many notorious lies delivered persuasively and in the way of truth” 
(Lucian 4). However, Lucian’s rhetoric is complex, as not all of his claims are delivered purely 
“in the way of truth.” He uses one style to emphasize his text’s mendacity, and another to 
emphasize its veracity, transposing his logical paradox into stylistic terms for further emphasis.  
In the text proper, Lucian undermines the narrator’s assertion that his story is historically 
accurate by having him employ the style of classical epics. When describing a battle between 
solar and lunar armies, Lucian’s style evokes that of the catalogue of ships from Homer’s Iliad, 
as literary critic Aaron Parrett notes (17-18). As previously discussed, the classical epic occupies 
a middle space between truth and fiction as a fictionalized narrative of real historical events. 
However, Lucian imports an epic rhetoric into a context that stresses that the events portrayed 
actually occurred as described. As a result, The Iliad’s fictional element taints the verisimilitude 
of Lucian’s narrator’s prose by suggesting that his catalogue, too, involves fictional elements, 




the narrator’s claims to veracity in the text proper, creating discursive instead of logical 
contradiction. 
In contrast to his use of epic rhetoric, Lucian’s narrator situates his story as having 
actually occurred when he appeals to visual evidence, embodying a sort of proto-empiricism by 
describing his supposed reliance on immediate observation. Such “eyewitness investigation 
(opsis)” is one of Herodotus’s tactics (Dewald xxx), and Lucian’s use of it reveals it to be an 
empty gesture. Lucian’s narrator occasionally withholds claims in the purported absence of 
direct observation, such as when he hears of a monstrous army approaching the lunar-solar battle 
and notes, “…I had no sight of them, for they were not yet come, and therefore I durst write 
nothing, though wonderful and incredible reports were given out of them” (Lucian 19). The 
narrator’s putative avoidance of these “wonderful and incredible reports” suggests that his report, 
by contrast, is true. When Lucian’s narrator does provide this description, he qualifies it in terms 
that emphasize his observation of them, declaring, “And when they drew so near unto us that we 
could take full view of them, it was a strange sight to behold such monsters…” (25). While the 
narrator’s supposed reliance on ocular evidence would normally encourage belief, Lucian 
situates this proto-empiricism in a satirical context where the tale’s interpretive paradox and the 
scene’s tale’s fantastic content reveal the rhetorical ploy to be empty. Just because discourse 
claims immediate observation doesn’t mean that its content is true.  
Lucian also reveals the use of banal details to elicit belief through verisimilitude to be 
another empty gesture by using it to describe overtly fictional events. Parrett asserts that “this air 
of verisimilitude strengthens Lucian’s satirical technique…[adding] force through credibility” 
(16). For instance, when the narrator describes how his ship leaves the Earth by way of a giant 




the scene. He makes note of the wind conditions before the incident (“the wind serving us 
weakly…”), the time of the event (“about noon”), the approximate height to which his ship was 
lifted (“some three thousand furlongs”), and the amount of time he sailed before reaching the 
lunar nation (“seven days’ space”) – all attempts to temper a fabulous scene with believable 
details, of the sort that would have been included in reports of actual naval incidents (Lucian 13). 
However, the verisimilitude typically associated with these details is disrupted by the scene’s 
fantastic content, enhancing Lucian’s satire by demonstrating how one can make even the most 
fantastic happenings sound plausible with the right rhetoric.  
True History demonstrates how the LTN emerged from a debate over how to respond to 
texts that mix fact and fiction, yet purport to be true. This origin is significant, as True History 
provided a model for English LTNs when it was translated into English in 1634. Marjorie Hope 
Nicholson identifies this translation as perhaps “responsible for the increasing interest in the 
theme [of lunar travel] in England after that date” (14). Lucian’s text thus became the model 
lunar travel narrative for European writers, helping to explain why 17th-century LTNs continue 
to use their own prose to engage in debates over discursive believability, and why authors 
continued to produce similar satires through the 18th century. These later texts continue to use 
contradiction to expose the power of verisimilar discourses to convince. However, when they are 
implicated in the development of another discourse that becomes more ostensibly reliable than 
that of travel narratives, their criticism takes this discourse - the discourse of empirical science - 





“Theoretical speculation and visual experience”4: LTNs as Scientific Speculation 
 Before discussing the first English lunar travel narrative (LTN), it is crucial that we 
examine how at the turn of the 17th century, the moon was redefined as a site of scientific 
investigation. It was implicated in the developing trend of empiricism, which held that 
knowledge arises only through immediate experience and therefore relies on observation and/or 
experimentation for validity (“empiricism, n.”). It may seem that while LTNs actively change in 
response to scientific progress, science remains a bastion of truth impervious to literary 
developments. This, however, is not true. As Roland Barthes reminded us long ago, science is as 
discursive a formation as literature (4). Literary critic Mary Louise Pratt evokes this sentiment 
when she writes that “knowledge exist[s] not as a static accumulation of facts…but as human 
activities, tangles of verbal and non-verbal practices” (29), as does Foucault’s description of 
“natural history as…“a description of the visible” (Foucault qtd. in Pratt 28). Dwight Atkinson 
offers similar insight: 
Empirical science is generally considered to represent the dominant knowledge 
system in the industrialized world today. For many years, the hegemony of the 
sciences went unquestioned in the world—as a form of knowledge which was 
self-evident, self-regulating, and beyond the reach of human subjectivity. Only in 
the last 40 years have these assumptions begun to be critically examined. (xvii) 
 
I see my thesis, and particularly this section, as participating in this critical investigation. In such 
an examination, LTNs are particularly useful; they offer us a view of the early machinery of 
scientific exposition and debate, exposing cognitive and epistemic mixtures of fact and fiction at 
work in its discourse. While empiricism retains an association with fact, its roots demonstrate 
that it uses fictional discourse in speculation, theory, and thought experiments.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




This section traces the incorporation of fictional discourse into the growing empirical 
paradigm around the beginning of the 17th century, paying particular attention to the effect this 
development has on empiricism’s definition of facts. I hope to combat the positivism of naïve 
empiricism (the idea that “a fact is a fact”) and demonstrate that instead, what can be considered 
a fact is determined by the theoretical infrastructure at work in a given culture at any given time. 
To demonstrate this, I will first contextualize early empiricism in contrast to fiction through a 
comparison of earth-moon analogies in Spenser’s The Faerie Queene (1590) and Galileo’s 
Sidereus Nuncius (1610). Then, I will analyze discussions of an inhabited moon in two works by 
Johannes Kepler, Conversation with the Starry Messenger (1610) and Somnium (The Dream) 
(1634). These works employ the fact-fiction collision in different ways to argue for the place of 
fictional elements like theory, speculation, and thought experiments in the scientific paradigm. 
At the start of the 17th century, European popular epistemology was as much defined by 
what it did not know as by what it did. Unexplored territories surrounded known locales on maps 
and were often blazoned with a telling phrase: “Humanos oculus non videt – no human eye has 
seen it” (Nicholson Voyages 5-6). In this way, the unknown was not figured as merely a lack of 
experience, but specifically as a lack of vision. However, not everyone needed personally to 
view the lands that were being discovered across vast oceans in order to believe that they existed. 
Because the experiences of travelers lay beyond the common reader’s ability to observe, readers 
were encouraged to believe textual claims in the absence of visual experience, in response to 
determinate textual cues. 
In The Faerie Queene (1590), Edmund Spenser employs this belief in the existence of 
things not personally observed to compare fancy to fact and legitimate the project of speculative 




“th’aboundance of an idle braine” and a “painted forgery,” he emphasizes how little of the world 
is known to man, and how “dayly…through hardy enterprise, / Many great regions are 
discouered, / Which to late age were neuer mentioned,” citing Peru, the Amazon river, and 
Virginia as examples (Spenser 157). Spenser then decries anyone who would require visual 
evidence for belief, claiming that only “witlesse [men]” assume “that nothing is, but that which 
he hath seene.” (Spenser 158). Undiscovered worlds exist, he asserts; perhaps even in the moon: 
What if within the Moones faire shining sphere[,] 
What if in euery other starre vnseene  
Of other worldes [one] happily should heare? 
[One] wo[n]der would much more: yet such to some appeare. (Spenser 158) 
 
 
If readers were expected to believe in the existence of Virginia, a faraway land that few would 
ever visit, it follows that this sort of imagination might apply itself to fictional creations, and 
characterize them as extant but unseen as well. As critic David Cressy notes, “Rhetorically, for 
Spenser, the moon was a bridge from the newfound lands of America to the undiscovered world 
of “faerie land” (961). Spenser’s analogy combines fact and fiction in order to encourage 
readers’ suspension of disbelief regarding his fantastic subject material.  
The moon, however, inverts the conundrum figured by Virginia and Peru. Instead of a 
place said to be explored but unable to be seen by the general public, the moon was a purely 
visual terrain that all could see but none could explore – what Donald Rumsfeld might dub a 
“known unknown,” (“Defense.gov”) and what Cressy encapsulates in the phrase “comfortingly 
familiar, yet achingly distant” (961). Because no sensory experience was available concerning 
the lunar surface, claims about it could not be confirmed or denied; the moon was a space of 
improbability and likelihood, not impossibility and certainty. Seen but not known, it invited both 




The invention of the telescope fundamentally altered Western culture’s perception of the 
moon while simultaneously changing the way in which fact-fiction analogies like Spenser’s 
functioned in descriptions of the lunar surface. Upon constructing his first telescope in 1610, 
Galileo Galilei was able to observe the moon’s surface more accurately than ever before, and he 
recorded his experience in Sidereus Nuncius, or The Starry Messenger (1610). In this text, the 
style of Galileo’s prose emphasizes reproducible observation to legitimate his claims. 
Considering the nature of the telescope, this is an unsurprising emphasis, but what’s notable here 
is its departure from Spenser’s invocation of blind faith. Indeed, sight is foregrounded in the 
opening lines of Galileo’s text when he states “It is a very beautiful thing, and most gratifying to 
the sight, to behold the body of the moon,” establishing his role as observer (27). Similarly, when 
describing the lunar surface, Galileo parallels his telescope-aided observations with those made 
directly with the senses in order to elicit belief, as in the following passage: 
In this way one may learn with all the certainty of sense evidence that the moon is 
not robed in a smooth and polished surface but is in fact rough and uneven, 
covered everywhere, just like the earth’s surface, with huge prominences, deep 
valleys, and chasms. (28)  
 
This passage suggests that observations made with his telescope should be granted the same self-
evidence as those made directly with the senses. Galileo’s use of tactile adjectives like “smooth,” 
“rough,” and “uneven” emphasizes this point by rhetorically compensating for the evidence the 
moon as a subject excludes. Also, in describing the lunar surface as being “just like the earth’s,” 
Galileo constructs an analogy to make his subject material seem familiar. 
 The moon-earth analogy that Galileo constructs differs significantly from Spenser’s. This 
difference is most apparent when Galileo argues for the existence of lunar mountains based on 




“many bright points appear within the darkened portion of the moon” and as it turns, they 
“gradually increase in size and brightness” until they “become joined with the rest of the lighted 
part” (Galilei 33). When analyzing this evidence, Galileo transports it into a more familiar 
context by asking rhetorical questions that compare his observations to earthly phenomena: 
And on the earth, before the rising of the sun, are not the highest peaks of the 
mountains illuminated by the sun’s rays while the plains remain in shadow? Does 
not the light go on spreading while the larger central parts of those mountains are 
becoming illuminated? And when the sun has finally risen, does not the 
illumination of plains and hills finally become one? (33) 
 
Galileo here invokes his reader’s faith in lunar mountains that are not directly observed (Miller), 
just as Spenser does with his unseen worlds. However, where the faith Spenser elicits from 
readers is truly blind in the sense that he encourages belief in things unseen, Galileo inverts the 
analogy and grounds his reader’s faith in the presence of indirect visual evidence instead of a 
lack of visual evidence. Where Spenser’s analogy uses fact to justify fiction, Galileo’s analogy 
substantiates his claims with indirect visual evidence and trims fiction out of the equation. 
 This shift from belief in things unseen to belief substantiated by indirect evidence has a 
crucial effect on the trajectory of empirical discourse. The increased emphasis on observation 
means that only visible phenomena can be regarded as facts, to the exclusion of the consideration 
of things that cannot be viewed: Spenser’s fairy land is no longer a permissible subject because 
nothing seen connects us to it, but Galileo’s mountains are, because he interprets something he 
sees as being their shadows. However, as Galileo’s shadows demonstrate, empiricism gives to 
unobservable phenomena the status of fact via the interpretation of indirect evidence. This, as it 
turns out, opens the floodgates and allows empirical discourse to incorporate fictional elements 




and fictive elements is initially unstable, it results in a much more developed empirical paradigm, 
as works by Johannes Kepler attest to and support. 
Discursive hybridity is a defining feature of Kepler’s Conversation with the Starry 
Messenger (1610) and his LTN Somnium, or The Dream (1634). Factual and fictive discourses 
mingle in different ways in each text: in Conversation’s consideration of an inhabited moon, 
Kepler uses fact to substantiate speculation, while in Somnium, he surrounds facts with a fictive 
frame narrative. Kepler’s application of fictional elements to the moon-earth analogy allows him 
to demonstrate that knowledge is best supported by a mixture of sensory observation and 
theoretical speculation instead of a sole reliance on observation. In these texts, Kepler creates a 
niche for fictive discourse within the developing scientific paradigm by manipulating the link 
between empirical epistemology and the discourse that embodies it.  
Observation provides the context for imaginative speculation in Conversation with the 
Starry Messenger, and this combination allows Kepler to import cultural fictions into a scientific 
space. He begins with a single observation of the moon’s surface, admitting “I cannot help 
wondering about the meaning of that large circular cavity in what I usually call the left corner of 
the mouth [of the Man in the Moon]”  (Kepler, Conversation 28). By locating his observation on 
the face of the Man in the Moon, Kepler recruits a folk metaphor to his purportedly scientific 
observation, mapping out his empirical observation on a map defined by a cultural fiction and 
demonstrating how effective an empiricism that mixes fictional and factual discourses can be. 
Soon after, Kepler asks of this crater, “Is it a work of nature, or of a trained hand?” 
(Conversation 28). This tottering question allows him to transition from observation to 




Kepler grounds this speculative supposition in observation and astronomical facts: 
It surely stands to reason that the inhabitants express the character of their 
dwelling place, which has much bigger mountains and valleys than our earth has. 
Consequently, being endowed with very massive bodies, they also construct 
gigantic projects. Their day is as long as 15 of our days, and they feel insufferable 
heat. Perhaps they lack stone for erecting shelters against the sun. On the other 
hand, maybe they have a soil as sticky as clay. Their usual building plan, 
accordingly, is as follows. Digging up huge fields, they carry out the earth and 
heap it in a circle, perhaps for the purpose of drawing out the moisture down 
below. In this way they may hide deep in the shade behind their excavated 
mounds and, in keeping with the sun’s motion, shift about inside, clinging to the 
shadow. They have, as it were, a sort of underground city. They make their homes 
in numerous caves hewn out of that circular embankment. They place their fields 
and pastures in the middle to avoid being forced to go too far way from their 
farms in their flight from the sun. (Conversation 28) 
 
As Kepler alternates between accepted fact and far-fetched speculation, he initially emphasizes 
his facts with assertive phrases like “It surely stands to reason,” “Consequently,” and 
“accordingly,” while flagging his speculations as hypothetical with qualifiers like “perhaps” and 
“maybe.” However, a transition occurs in the sentence “Their usual building plan, accordingly, is 
as follows” – this “accordingly” refers not to fact but to the speculation that “maybe” the moon 
has clay-like soil. After this hinge sentence, Kepler assertively relates speculation that serves to 
explain the observation of the lunar cavity, using strong verbs (e.g. “they carry,” “they make,” 
and “they place”) and reserving qualifications like “perhaps” for extraneous details. By 
grounding his imaginative speculation in an observation and using astronomical facts and 
assertively logical rhetoric to progress from point to point, Kepler is able to explain an 
observation with a surprising amount of literary fictiveness, appealing to readers’ imaginations 
as much as their senses. Fact here serves as a support justifying Kepler’s inclusion of imaginative 
theories. As fantastic as this thought experiment appears, it demonstrates the combination of 




insightful than an empiricism restricted to observable phenomena.  
Kepler prefaces the previous passage with a parenthetical remark on how “[he] enjoyed 
toying with this idea [of an inhabited moon], long ago in a disputation written at Tübingen in the 
year 1593” (Conversation 28). This “disputation,” Kepler’s speculative dissertation “How do the 
Heavens appear to a Man located on the Moon?” (Bozzetto 372), eventually became Somnium, 
or The Dream, Kepler’s LTN that more fully explores the possibilities that discursive hybridity 
affords in the empirical paradigm. Kepler molded his dissertation into a hybrid work by 
surrounding his empirical speculation with a fantastic frame narrative concerning lunar travel. 
Recognizing its inherent division, critic Roger Bozzetto has since called the work a “half-
fictional, half-nonfictional text,” maintaining that the text’s discourse is “fragmented and 
dichotomized,” as “the fiction and science are articulated separately” (374, 375, 375). Somnium 
establishes this rift between fiction and fact not only in contrasting discourses, but also in 
features such as the text/footnote divide, the use of multiple narrators, and the support of 
multiple simultaneous interpretations. Because it anchors the fact-fiction divide in its constitutive 
elements, Somnium supports factual and fictive readings simultaneously. It makes space for 
fiction alongside science in empiricism and demonstrates that this combination produces a more 
robust empirical methodology by allowing more information to be considered as facts. 
Somnium integrates fiction into empiricism by employing three increasingly fantastic 
narrators. The story begins as an implied narrator falls asleep and dreams that he is reading a 
book written by the second narrator, a fictional character named Duracotas. Duracotas tells his 
life story and stops narrating when his mother, a witch, summons the Daemon from Levania, the 
third narrator. This fantastic lunar creature discusses interplanetary travel and the appearance of 




This complex embedding of narrators allows Kepler to situate the scientific nexus of his 
text – his consideration of “How…the Heavens appear to a Man located on the Moon” (Bozzetto 
372) - within layers of dream and fictional discourse. This organization grants him the freedom 
to invoke unobserved phenomena not normally supported by the empirical mentality as facts. As 
Kepler himself writes in Somnium’s notes, "In a dream it is necessary to have the freedom 
sometimes to invent that which was never perceived” (89). Significantly, Kepler doesn’t claim 
that these inventions are untrue, merely that they haven’t yet been perceived – one step farther 
from the indirect evidence of Galileo’s lunar mountains toward Spenser’s unseen fairy land, but 
still a perspective associating knowledge with observation in a speculative fashion. This is 
appropriate for Kepler’s thesis, as it originally concerned what would be seen were someone to 
examine the night sky on the moon. Such freedom to consider phenomena not directly observed 
is necessary to Somnium’s goal of supporting the Copernican, heliocentric theory of the universe, 
which was not as convincing when restricted to contemporary visual observations (Raz Chen-
Morris 227). As Bozzetto puts it, “[Somnium’s] many interlocking levels of narration…mediate 
its fictional/non-fictional discourse,” allowing Kepler to address the possibilities of astronomical 
observations made from the moon, ideas not strictly tethered to firsthand observations (373). 
 As mentioned, Kepler’s text also supports simultaneous but separate scientific and 
fictional readings by employing a division between his text and its footnotes. Kepler appended 
two hundred and twenty three notes to his text proper, as well as a “Geographical, or, if you 
prefer, Selenographical Appendix” which included notes of its own (149). Bozetto characterizes 
this structure as relegating science to “a massive support-structure of didactic endnotes totally 
exterior to the fictional narrative itself” that are “nevertheless meant to be read concurrently with 




a single correct interpretation, but envelops the narrative, dividing the story’s fiction and science 
into two distinct sections designed to support multiple concurrent interpretations. 
 One can see how Somnium’s structure supports simultaneous factual and fictional 
interpretations of its story when Duracotas explains that he and his mother “covered [their] heads 
with [their] clothing” moments before his mother summons the Daemon (Somnium 14). While 
the story’s text contextualizes this detail as part of an occult summoning ritual, Kepler’s notes on 
the line reinterpret the moment. He explains how “with this very rite (ha, how magically 
magical!)...[he and others] had observed a solar eclipse” in 1605; because they “lacked a dark 
room…[they] covered [their] heads with [their] coats and kept out the daylight in that way” 
(Somnium 60). Kepler’s parenthetical anecdote dispels the occult connotations fostered by the 
story proper, allowing him to describe a scientific practice in its place. As Chen-Morris explains, 
“In this anecdote, the magic of Duracotus's mother is converted into science,” and “[a]ttention is 
turned not to…apparent meaning but to the technique of observation. Kepler suggests optical 
instruments…as reliable vehicles of knowledge” (239). Thus, Somnium’s fictional-factual 
discursive overlap does not here destabilize empiricism, but rather emphasizes how trustworthy 
empirical instruments are! 
 The phrase “Daemon from Levania” also pinpoints a discursive divide between fictional 
text and factual notes. The narrative plays up the fantastic connotations of the word “Daemon,” 
but its notes divest the term of mystery, claiming it was derived to mean “[k]nowledge of the 
phenomena of the heavenly bodies; from daiein, meaning ‘to know’” (Somnium 62). Of the 
similarly mysterious-sounding “Levania,” Kepler remarks in his notes, “‘Moon’ in Hebrew is 
Lebana or Levana. I could have called it ‘Selenitis,’ but Hebrew words, being less familiar to our 




chooses “Levania” for its mysterious connotations reveals how deliberately he uses fictional 
discourse in his frame narrative in contrast to his notes’ empirical discourse. 
 Kepler’s text juxtaposes fiction and fact in numerous ways, and this juxtaposition is 
generically significant. Somnium’s doubled discourse transforms it into what Bozzetto calls an 
“epistemological stepping-stone” between texts that “evoke the marvelous” and those that 
“propose an imaginative exploration of the outer edges of a reality already defined…by accepted 
scientific fact” (372). Its “innovative fictional vehicle…bridges the gap (however primitively) 
between fantasy discourse and scientific discourse” (Bozzetto 372). However, this “bridge” is 
not merely a literary artifact; Kepler engineered it to intervene in his era’s scientific paradigm. 
Kepler imagined Somnium’s composite status as having contemporary consequences. On 
one hand, he combined fact and fiction to entice readers into accepting the Copernican 
heliocentric theory of the solar system, a theory they would likely balk at in other contexts due to 
the church’s fierce disapproval of it. As Chen-Morris puts it, Kepler “wrap[s] an uncomfortable 
truth in a brilliant and attractive camouflage” (226), a tactic which he quotes Kepler himself 
explaining in another work via a comparison with medicine:  
We may observe (in order to cure the crowd's craving for marvels) what 
physicians observe in the sick, that we may make use of the unnatural and 
pernicious appetites of the crowd to get them to swallow (as medicine) such 
advice (diagnosed as prognostication) as may serve to remove this disease of the 
mind, and which otherwise we could scarcely have persuaded them to take. 
(Kepler quoted in Chen-Morris, 226). 
 
Kepler here recognizes fiction as a cultural craving that empirical science can employ to promote 
its ideas, demonstrating one use of fiction in the empirical paradigm. 




epistemic changes within the empirical paradigm itself. Kepler’s use of the fantastic suggests that 
theories and speculations are as necessary to the study of astronomy as immediate sensory 
perceptions. As Bozzetto notes, elements of Kepler’s text such as “the image of the waxing and 
waning of the Earth in the Moon’s sky” are “created and sustained by means of scientific 
hypothesis (Copernican astronomy) and mathematical demonstration” (374). In a time that 
stressed immediate sensory observation as the basis of fact, hypotheses like these were popularly 
held by many to be no more believable than fictions (Chen-Morris 229-230). However, Somnium 
combats this limitation because its fantastic elements “[are] the direct result of the internal logic 
of a newly-conceived model of reality…within which readers are obliged to believe their brains, 
not their eyes” (Bozzetto 374). Fiction allows Kepler to encourage his audience to treat 
observable things and factual things as two distinct categories, creating space for speculation in 
the empirical paradigm. As Chen-Morris summarizes, “Direct experience by itself is limited and 
cannot give the causes of phenomena,” but Somnium “[creates] a rupture between experience and 
theory” (229). Kepler articulates this rupture throughout Somnium’s notes: he describes a region 
of the moon “[w]hich no eye has ever seen,” but claims, “[y]et in my discussion…you observe 
sound reasoning,” and similarly characterizes certain elements of his text as being based on 
“pure reasoning, divorced from any visual evidence” (128-129, 240). By treating theory and fact 
as two distinct yet equally viable categories of thought, Kepler helps to legitimate the place of 
theory and its often imaginative discourse within the empirical mindset. 
While they stem from different discursive traditions over a millennium apart, Lucian’s 
and Kepler’s texts both concern the relationship between fact and fiction. The first English LTN 
continues this trend; it combines the discourses of travel narrative satire and empiricism, creating 




Chapter Two: Intersection and Indeterminacy 
In the 1630s, lunar travel narratives (LTNs) emerged as chimeras incorporating the 
moon’s role as a site of travelers’ fantasies (e.g. Lucian’s True History), as well as its identity as 
a symbol of empiricist description and speculation, as in Kepler’s Conversation and Somnium. 
As the previous chapter discussed, the LTN’s parent discourses each mixed fact and fiction, so 
it’s no surprise that the complications this mixture engenders in each individual discourse 
proliferate and deepen when the discourses meet in the first English LTN. 
In this chapter, I discuss this work, Francis Godwin’s The Man in the Moon, or a 
Discourse of a Voyage Thither, by Domingo Gonsales, the Speedy Messenger (1638), as well as 
two early responses two it: Cyrano de Bergerac’s satirical use of Godwin’s narrative in Voyage 
dans la Lune (1657) and Bishop John Wilkins’s serious use of it in the 1640 revision of his 1638 
treatise A Discovery of a New World, or A Discourse Tending to Prove, that 'Tis Probable There 
May Be Another Habitable World in the Moon. A careful examination of this initial discursive 
juxtaposition and its effects will prepare the reader to appreciate how the complications that arise 
in Godwin’s text appear in both satirical and serious responses to it, as well as in the genre 
throughout the 18th century. These complications come to define the genre’s overt critique of 
scientific discourse when the Royal Society creates its “plain style,” a convenient target. 
However, examining them at their source reveals how quickly culturally-created categories break 







Francis Godwin’s The Man in the Moone: First (Discursive) Contact 
Published posthumously in 1638, Francis Godwin’s The Man in the Moone, or 
a Discourse of a Voyage Thither, by Domingo Gonsales, the Speedy Messenger combines 
Lucian’s competing truth claims with Kepler’s empirical discourse in a single text. It employs a 
naïve empiricist mode instead of a satirical one; that is, it does not critique empiricism’s 
purported association with truth. Instead, it uses reliable discourses like that of empiricism to 
elicit belief for its own fantastic claims. However, the tale also hints that it is fictional, leading to 
contradiction. This contradiction results in the blurring of categories typically received as 
mutually exclusive, revealing their instability in a time when they were still forming. 
 The text foregrounds this contradiction in its “Epistle to the Reader.” Written by one 
“E.M.,” it sharply contrasts the fictional and factual interpretations that are each elicited more 
subtly throughout the story proper. Updating the opposing claims of Lucian’s two warring 
narrators, the Epistle’s single narrator articulates two opposing interpretations in succession, 
bolstering each with an appropriate rhetoric. This rhetoric initially elicits skepticism, calling the 
story “an essay of Fancy, where Invention is Shewed with Judgment” (Godwin, Epistle). The 
sentence’s phrasing signals that the story’s fictive status will be complex and unstable, involving 
both fictional “Invention” and sober “Judgment.” When the Epistle declares that “It was not the 
Authors intention (I presume) to discourse thee into a beleife of each particular circumstance,” 
it attempts to clear Godwin of the charge of willful deceit and in doing so implicitly affirms that 
his text has the power to convince (Godwin, Epistle). At this point, the Epistle has characterized 
the story as fictional and warned about the dangers of falling for its gestures that elicit belief.  
However, in direct contradiction of this warning, the Epistle concludes by framing the 




great a Paradox as now that the Moon should be habitable,” the Epistle parallels the real 
discovery of the moon’s solid body with the narrative’s claims, making them seem plausible by 
analogy, as in Spenser’s comparison between Fairy Land and Virginia (Godwin, Epistle). When 
suggesting that “the knowledge of [new worlds] may seeme more properly reserv’d for this our 
discovering age: in which our Galilaeusses, can by advantage of their spectacles gaze the Sunne 
into spots, & descry mountaines in the Moon,” the Epistle also references contemporary 
scientific discoveries to enlist the reliability of Galileo and advanced technology in its favor 
(Godwin, Epistle). Ostentatiously constructed from opposing arguments, the Epistle anticipates 
the alternation of belief and skepticism in the LTN that follows. 
The Epistle’s conflict between verisimilitude and fictionality permeates the story proper, 
an account supposedly written by the fictional first-person participant narrator Domingo 
Gonsales. Some of the story’s elements elicit belief, while others elicit skepticism, and the 
tension between fact and fiction eventually erupts into indeterminacy. While Kepler’s Somnium 
can support two interpretations at once due to its bifurcated structure, Godwin’s text provides no 
such support, instead making its discourses compete for a single interpretation throughout the 
body of his work, as in the Epistle. This leads to the collapse of seemingly-reliable categories.  
Because of its fantastic lunar content, Gonsales’s narrative often aims to solicit belief. It 
accomplishes this by drawing stylistic parallels between the style of Gonsales’s prose and other 
putatively reliable contemporary discourses. Reliable discourse first appears in conjunction with 
realistic content, establishing Gonsales as a trustworthy source of information. Gonsales’s 
account begins with a dramatic but plausible personal history involving him falling ill during a 
sea voyage and recovering on the island of St. Helena (Godwin 14). St. Helena’s status as a real 




vital strategic importance to ships,” which would often “take on essential stores and leave sick 
crew members to recover in its healthy climate” (“St. Helena Tourism”). As Campbell notes in 
Impossible Voyages, “This bracketing of the impossible destination by those visitable and visited 
provides the lunar account with a thin sheen of authenticity” (5).  
Gonsales describes this realistic content with reliable discourses, further attesting to his 
credibility. He describes St. Helena as “situate[d] in the Altitude of 16. degrees to the South, and 
is about 3. leagues in compasse, having no firme land or continent within 300,” using 
quantitatively precise language to evoke empirical works and appear just as reliable (Godwin 
16). He then catalogues the island’s flora and fauna in detail, as in this truncated excerpt:  
 
…there [are]…fruit-Trees, especially Oranges, Limmons, Pomgranats, Almonds, 
and the like, which beare Fruit all the yeare long, as doe also the fig-Trees, Vines, 
Peare-Trees (whereof there are divers sorts,) Palmitos, Cocos, Olives, Plumms; 
also I have seene there such as wee call Damaxœlas, but few; as for Apples I dare 
say there are none at all…(Godwin, 16-17) 
 
The form and length of Godwin’s list mimic the style of earlier reports of newly discovered 
lands, such as Thomas Hariot’s Briefe and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia 
(1588), which includes “Chestnuts,” “Walnuts,” “Medlars,” “Grapes,” “Strawberries,” 
“Mulberries,” “Applecrabs,” and “wilde peaze” in its extensive descriptive catalogue of New 
World plants (Hariot 25-26). While previous reports like Hariot’s often borrowed details from 
earlier narratives and embellished them, they referred to real places and were grounded in factual 
observation. So, in conjunction with the tale’s initially realistic content, this stylistic parallel 
posits Gonsales as a credible observer before his tale’s content becomes fantastic. 
Gonsales similarly uses the reliable discourse of empiricism to add credibility to his 




this section emphasizes the process of experimentation that led him to construct a flying 
“Engine” pulled by trained geese, or “Gansa’s” (Godwin 32, 27). In one lengthy introductory 
phrase, “In this cogitation having much laboured my wits, and made some triall, I found by 
experience, that…by reason,” the narrator emphasizes the empiricist ideals of “triall,” 
“experience,” and “reason,” all words likely to inspire belief (Godwin 24). Gonsales continues to 
use meticulous empirical discourse when he outlines the construction of his prototype engine, 
including quantitative measurements and detailing the materials that he employs: 
I fastned [sic] about every one of my Gans’as a little pulley of Corke, and putting 
a string through it of meetly [sic] length, I fastened the one end thereof unto a 
blocke almost of eight Pound weight, unto the other end of the string I tied a 
poyse [sic] weighing some two Pound, which being done, and causing the signall 
to be erected, they presently rose all (being 4 in number,) and carried away my 
blocke unto the place appointed. (Godwin 25-26) 
 
Where Gonsales previously imitated descriptions of newly discovered lands in order to make his 
claims seem plausible, he here imitates the form of contemporary descriptions of inventions. One 
may see this comparison explicitly delineated by comparing the description of his fictional 
engine to the following, taken from A Treatise of Artifical Fire-works Both for Warres and 
Recreation, a 1628 treatise that describes the construction of a real invention, a firework-canon: 
This instrument may bee made of…red copper, brasse and [iro]nne, but very little 
of the two last…and beeing made of this stuffe, let the measures following be 
observed. If the diameter of the calliber or bore be one foot, let the morter be two 
foot of length & let the sack or hole for the powder be the third part of a foot 
broad, and halfe a foot deep…as doth plainely demonstrate the Figure A 
following. (Malthus and Cecil 5-6) 
 
Gonsales’s account mimics familiar features of this excerpt’s style - quantitative measurements, 




implicitly suggests that it is as possible to build a flying engine as it is to build real machines 
outlined in similar descriptions. Thus, this stylistic parallel bolsters the tale’s plausibility. 
The Man in the Moon went through three editions before 1657, and each includes an 
illustration of Gonsales airborne in his machine (Lawton 52-53). These images add further 
credibility to Gonsales’s account by mimicking the form of invention descriptions in a way that 
relies on visual instead of textual similarities. A Treatise of Artificial Fire-works includes a 
diagram, “Figure A,” in order to “plainely demonstrate” the writer’s description of the machine 
to readers, and Gonsales’s narrative mimics this convention by including an illustration of the 
narrator flying in his successfully assembled engine (Godwin 28). However, the illustrations in A 
Treatise and The Man in the Moone differ in one important aspect – Godwin’s image, instead of 
merely demonstrating what the narrator’s engine looks like when completed, attests to the fact 
that it actually exists and functions as described, constituting an image-based appeal to 
verisimilitude. Godwin’s inclusion of visual evidence further associates his story with believable 
accounts of real inventions by appealing to the empiricist association between observation and 
credibility, albeit indirectly in the form of an illustration. 
While many of its elements work to elicit belief, at other moments, Gonsales’s narrative 
invites skepticism, complicating its status as fact or fiction in much the same way as its Epistle 
does. For instance, similarities arise between Gonsales’s text and tales exposed within the 
storyline as being false. Early in the story, Gonsales tells an anecdote that features a printed 
travel account telling lies. “A certaine great Count of ours came home from the West-Indies, in 
triumphant manner, boasting and sending out his declarations in print, of a great victory hee had 
obtained against the English,” Gonsales reports, before adding, “Whereas the truth is, he got of 




Gonsales’s tale is also itself a travel account; this similarity invites comparison between the 
anecdote’s story and The Man in the Moone which disrupts readers’ suspension of disbelief and 
inspires suspicion. Also, the mere mention of lies being conveyed “in print” encourages further 
suspicion, as it emphasizes another feature that the two texts share. 
Gonsales's account also emphasizes the fictionality of his description of the moon 
through paradoxes of observation and description found within it. Nowhere is this more apparent 
than when he attempts to describe the color of the lunarians’ garb. Gonsales prefaces his attempt 
to describe this new color by invoking the “inexpressibility topos” (Campbell “Speedy” 198): 
“[N]either (which is most strange, of all other) can I devise how to describe the colour of them,” 
he declares, before providing a string of negative constructions: “It was neither blacke, nor 
white, yellow, nor redd, greene nor blew, nor any colour composed of these” (Godwin 71). He 
then declares: “But if you aske me what it was then; I must tell you, it was a colour never seen in 
our earthly world, and therefore neither to be described unto us by any, nor to be conceived of 
one that never saw it” (Godwin 71). Gonsales shields his creation’s overt fictiveness by claiming 
that he cannot describe it. However, in contrast to the earlier detailed descriptions, one can’t help 
but suspect this detail of being fictive; Campbell remarks on how the account’s “emphatic 
fictionality [is] intensified by impossibilia and paradox” (“Speedy” 198). Gonsales’ paradoxes 
here exacerbate the fictionality of his claims by demonstrating an incompatibility between 
empirical, "factual" description and paradoxical content that can only exist on the fictive page. 
Godwin also invites his readers to consider Gonsales’s story as a work of fiction by 
opening it within a fictional genre. Domingo Gonsales’s stereotyped Spanish ethnicity and 
roguish actions that open the story establish him as a “picaro,” a “wandering rascal who uses his 




fiction (Poole 27). Godwin thus invokes a genre his readers would likely recognize as fictional, 
as the picaresque narrative was “readily available in England and in English throughout 
Godwin’s life and had already exerted an influence on Elizabethan prose fiction” (Poole 27). 
Indeed, an early reader of the text, Lady Brilliana Harley, associated The Man in the Moone with 
another famous picaresque fiction in “find[ing] it to be some kine to Donqueshot [i.e. Don 
Quixote]” (Harley qtd. in Poole 27). Campbell similarly identifies the picaresque as “a readable 
genre that broadcasts its fictionality to an experienced readership” (“Speedy” 197). 
However, fiction and fact do not remain so conveniently separate as they conflict within 
Godwin’s text. They invade each other in certain passages, causing confusion and inaugurating 
the indeterminacy that will categorize LTNs through the 18th century. The text’s use of multiple 
genres, empiricist theories, and timelines all result in fact and fiction intermingling for the first 
time within a single LTN, instantiating a trait that will characterize LTNs for centuries. 
The Man in the Moone becomes indeterminate by employing multiple genres, a maneuver 
which pitches the text into an indeterminate space between categories of fact and fiction. As 
Poole notes, “The Man in the Moone does not sustain picaresque…but it sounds enough quasi-
picaresque notes in its opening stages to evoke such a generic context” (28); it then shifts to 
incorporate what Campbell calls “imitation of the proto-ethnographic conventions of serious 
travel writing” (“Speedy” 198). In sum, Godwin uses a recognizably fictive genre, the 
picaresque, to convey the story’s most believable claims, before adopting a more realistic genre, 
that of the travel narrative, to convey his overtly fictional claims about the moon. Campbell 
describes the indeterminate result of this shift from mismatch to mismatch as “a novel genre, 
simultaneously and confusingly information-bearing and fantastical, which required of its initial 




this self-conscious reading practice provides the groundwork for later LTNs’ critiques of 
scientific discourse. Fact and fiction invade each other at the level of genre in Godwin, resulting 
in an indeterminate text. 
Gonsales’s recruitment of extant empirical theories also blurs categories of fact and 
fiction. He claims immediate observation of things allegedly seen en route to the moon and uses 
this putative evidence to deflect readers’ skepticism away from his own fictional account and 
toward extant astronomical theories. For instance, in stating “As for that Region of Fire our 
Philosophers talke of…mine eyes have sufficiently informed me there can be no such thing,” 
Godwin’s narrator foregrounds his alleged observation as if to suggest that his empiricist 
methodology gives his own claims precedence over others’ theories (66).  Similarly, he attacks 
the theory of gravity before commenting “But alas how many of [Philosophers’] Errors hath time 
and experience refuted in this our age,” making their theories seem more unbelievable than his 
lunar voyage because the empirical “experience” of his journey corrects them (Godwin 64). 
Gonsales exacerbates the difference between experience and theory in referring to the theories he 
opposes as “Vanities, fansies, [and] Dreames” (Godwin 65). He similarly characterizes these 
theories as specifically anti-empirical when he wishes “Philosophers and Mathematicians… [to] 
confesse the wilfulnesse of their owne blindnesse,” using an implicit metaphor of sight to 
characterize them as obstinately resistant and situate empiricism’s visual evidence in the right 
(Godwin 58). The narrator further emphasizes this divide between experience and theory when 
he claims, “I found then by this Experience [things] which no Philosopher ever dreamed of” – 
where Philosophers “dream,” the narrator “[finds] by Experience” (Godwin 46).  
In a strange reversal of Kepler’s use of fiction to argue for the inclusion of theory in the 




to expose other scientists’ theories as false because they involve no direct observation. In this 
context, believability becomes a relative thing – relative to the conventions of seeing and saying 
that the text juxtaposes, and relative in that Godwin’s assertions and the extant theories must 
compete for belief not in a mutually exclusive manner of believable or not, but in a manner of 
more and less believable. This relative construction of believability functions as a symptom of 
indeterminacy; mutually exclusive categories of fact and fiction dissolve, highlighting the text’s 
position in the indeterminate grey space between them. 
Gonsales’s narrative ends on a note of indeterminacy by collapsing two measurements of 
time: the real time of reading, and the time marked within Godwin’s fiction. Campbell analyzes 
this collapse in detail in her essay “Speedy Messengers.” She first remarks the narrative’s 
unusual emphasis on time as a way to elicit verisimilitude, as when Gonsales remarks, “[T]welve 
dayes was I upon my Voyage, and arrived in that Region of the Moone, that they call Simiri, 
September the 21 following. The 12th day of May, being Friday, we came unto the Court of the 
great Irdonozur” (Godwin 110). However, Campbell identifies another type of time functioning 
in that “the…narrative makes continual reference to its own existence in time, the time of 
reading”; this she identifies in Gonsales’s self-referential comments, as when he notes after a 
digression, “But where am I? At the first I promised a History, and I fall into disputes before I 
am aware” (Godwin 60). In this quotation, Gonsales refers to himself as a writer (i.e. “where am 
I?”) and considers his story as engaging the reader’s time, in this instance digressively. 
Campbell posits that these two types of time collapse in the final lines of Godwin’s text: 
There I did relate to Father Pantoja…these fore-related adventures, by whose 
directions I put them in writing, and sent this story of my misfortunes to Macao, 





This passage implicates the time the reader has spent reading Godwin’s text as part of the plot’s 
series of fictional events; because the reader is reading Gonsales’s narrative, it means that 
Gonsales’s return is imminent (Campbell, “Speedy” 200). “At this closing point...the reader’s 
time (Gonsales’s future) has been absorbed into the fiction,” Campbell argues, emphasizing that 
“this is the earliest text that [she] know[s] of in English to produce such a collapse of reading 
time and narrated time” and characterizing it as likely more disorienting than the text’s generic 
multiplicity to contemporary readers (“Speedy” 200-201). With this perplexing conclusion, the 
entirety of Gonsales’s narrative retroactively becomes an indeterminate text, something between 
fact and fiction but unable to fit simply into either category now that the binary has collapsed. 
 In sum, The Man in the Moone sometimes switches between fiction and fact as stable, 
opposing categories, but at other times blurs or splices these categories, resulting in an 
indeterminate text existing somewhere between fact and fiction and unable to be characterized 
completely by either designation. As Campbell summarizes, it “is effective, particularly for its 
early readers, in bridging a gulf between the known and the impossible, the near and the 
unimaginable, the actual and the fictional: that is, between realms as constitutively remote as the 
Earth and the Moon” (“Speedy” 201). As she notes, this indeterminacy likely made The Man in 
the Moone a bewildering text for contemporary readers (“Speedy” 200-201); it is still regarded as 
“a very curious piece of work” and “a literary surprise” to this day (Philmus 260; Campbell, 
“Speedy” 199). However, we should not be content merely to identify The Man in the Moone’s 
indeterminacy as an amusing anomaly, but rather follow it as it becomes a defining feature of 





Godwin’s Legacy: Indeterminate References in de Bergerac and Wilkins 
The rest of this chapter will examine two narratives that attempt to uncouple the 
discursive strands that The Man in the Moone first combined. Cyrano de Bergerac’s 1657 
Voyage dans la Lune [A Voyage to the Moon] imports Godwin’s text into a satirical context, 
while Bishop John Wilkins’s pamphlet A Discovery of a New World imports it into a serious, 
speculative context. However, a brief glance at the manner in which each of these texts 
references Godwin’s will demonstrate that the indeterminacy inaugurated by The Man in the 
Moone is not to be easily dismissed, as it brings indeterminacy to texts in which it is referenced. 
Godwin’s text demonstrates indeterminacy but does not employ it to satirical ends, 
remaining squarely within McKeon’s category of naïve empiricism. This is not so in de 
Bergerac’s Voyage dans la Lune [A Voyage to the Moon], which uses Godwin’s source material 
to expose and attack what critic Eric MacPhail identifies as “the paradox of literary truth,” the 
assumption that verisimilar literature portrays objective reality (37). De Bergerac’s LTN thus 
exists in the genre’s tradition of critiquing different formulations of truth.  
Certain scenes in de Bergerac’s work recognize other texts as fictions. This tactic 
destabilizes the satire at work by making de Bergerac’s text not only metafictional, but self-
referential. By implicating other fictional works as the butt of its jokes, it closes in on a trend of 
self-reflexive satire in LTNs that will mature in the 18th century, after the Royal Society 
influences scientific discourse. On the moon, de Bergerac’s narrator claims to have met a “little 
man,” who after greeting him in Spanish, “told [him] he was an European, a native of old 
Castille: That he had found a means by the help of Birds to mount up to the World of the Moon, 




Domingo Gonsales. Describing the scene’s effect on the narrative, MacPhail notes that “[t]he 
encounter with a fictional character on the moon certainly undermines the verisimilitude of [de 
Bergerac’s] text while blurring the boundaries between fiction and the real world to which fiction 
purports to refer” (41-42). The text thus manipulates its content to gesture to its own fictionality 
while its rhetoric continues to elicit belief (“I met…”). By splitting itself down the middle, it 
critiques the pretensions of verisimilar literature, but at a price of its own stability, importing not 
only Godwin’s text but also the indeterminacy it contains. 
While de Bergerac’s lunar voyage transposed Godwin’s project into the satirical mode, 
other authors sought to draw it into the opposing serious, empirical tradition, imbuing it with just 
as much epistemic complexity. In 1634, Bishop John Wilkins considered an inhabited moon in 
his treatise A Discovery of a New World, or A Discourse Tending to Prove, that 'Tis Probable 
There May Be Another Habitable World in the Moon. In contrast to de Bergerac’s satire, 
Discovery was not presented as a work of fiction, but as “a serious semiscientific work on the 
nature of the moon and the possibility of man's flying thither” (Nicholson, “Introduction” xii).  
By exposing the failings of purely visual empiricism, the treatise opens by defending its 
method of speculating about an inhabited moon. Wilkins initially recognizes the skepticism his 
ideas inspire and opposes a fictional interpretation of them. “True indeed,” he notes, “the 
strangeness of this opinion will detract much from its credit; but yet we should know that nothing 
is in its selfe strange…’tis our ignorance which makes things appeare so” (Wilkins, Discovery 
19). As an example of this, Wilkins adds that “you may as soone perswade some Country 
peasants that the Moone is made of greene Cheese (as wee say) as that ‘tis bigger than his Cart-
wheele, since both seeme equally to contradict his sight, and hee has not reason enough to leade 




of green cheese with the ignorance of the peasant, Wilkins associates cultural fictions with a sole 
reliance on sensory evidence, a position that he, like Kepler, opposes in favor of an empiricism 
that also involves speculation. 
However, in order to bolster his argument, Wilkins remains defensively speculative in his 
treatise, especially in regard to lunar inhabitants. The title of the work manifests this tendency; in 
“A Discovery of a New World, or A Discourse Tending to Prove, that 'Tis Probable There May 
be Another Habitable World in the Moon,” qualifiers like “Tending to Prove,” “Probable,” and 
“May Be” establish the work as dealing in probabilities, not facts. Wilkins also articulates this 
qualification in his preface, urging readers “[t]o remember that I promise onely probable 
arguments for the proofe of this opinion, and therefore [they] must not looke that every 
consequence should be of an undeniable dependance, or that the truth of each argument should 
be measured by its necessity” (Discovery, Preface). By constraining himself to plausible 
speculation, Wilkins, like Kepler, integrates fiction into the empirical paradigm. However, he 
hedges his bets and refuses to discuss the possibility and nature of lunar inhabitants, declaring “I 
dare not my selfe affirme any thing of these Selenites, because I know not any ground whereon 
to build any probable opinion” (Discovery 206-207). Cressy notes that Wilkins’s refusal to assert 
anything definite here allows him to “studiously [avoid] …fiction” (969).  
While Discovery initially avoids fiction, Wilkins becomes “the first to capitalize on [The 
Man in the Moone]” by using its literary fiction to inspire scientific speculation in the 1640 
revision of his treatise (Philmus 267). Wilkins writes that after penning Discovery, he “chanced 
upon a late fancy to this purpose under the fained name of Domingo Gonsales” in which 
“(besides sundry particulars wherein this later Chapter did unwittingly agree with it) there is 




(Discourse 240). These lines arrange a distinct rhetorical division between Godwin’s text, a 
“well contrived fancy” involving “fained” elements, and Wilkins’ own serious treatise, which 
only “unwittingly” corroborates some of Godwin’s points. The gap Wilkins draws between his 
speculations and Godwin’s fictions is further emphasized by the way in which he summarizes 
Godwin’s tale using the subjunctive mood and hypothetical constructions. For example, he 
writes, “[Gonsales] supposeth that many [geese] together, might be taught to carry the weight of 
a man; especially if an engine were so contrived (as he thinks it might) that each of them should 
beare an equall share in the burden” (Discourse 241, emphasis mine). Despite this overdrawn 
distinction, Wilkins’s text inadvertently reveals the ways in which Godwin’s fiction and his own 
speculation are similar, as they both rely upon eliciting belief, either suspension of disbelief or 
belief in plausibility. As evidence of this, Wilkins writes that Godwin concludes “that tis not 
altogether improbable, [the geese] should proceed from the Moone” (Discourse 241). As a result, 
literary and scientific methodologies overlap. Godwin’s fictional ideas are here directly 
integrated into a scientifically speculative context, demonstrating the overlap and growing 
confusion between genres.  
As de Bergerac’s and Wilkins’s responses demonstrate, Godwin’s indeterminacy did not 
remain confined within his text as a discursive anomaly, but spread to other works; it eventually 
became a defining feature of 18th-century LTNs. When responding to the Royal Society’s 
linguistic projects, this indeterminacy would power the genre’s most trenchant critiques of 






Chapter Three: The Royal Society’s Discourse And LTNs’ Satirical Critique 
Early empirical discourse emerged without the benefit of institutional structuring to guide 
its development, but this changed in 1660 with the establishment of England’s Royal Society 
(“History of the Royal Society”). In order to enhance the authority of scientific writing, this 
organization created its own particular version of empirical discourse and suggested that all texts 
that employed it had true content and all texts that did not were unreliable. The Royal Society, to 
align its own discourse exclusively with fact, thus encouraged a binary view of fact and fiction as 
mutually exclusive categories. 
This binary presented LTNs with a new target to critique, as it left indeterminate texts no 
place in which to exist comfortably. These texts began to do the same work as Lucian’s True 
History in a new scientific context: just as True History revealed travel writing to be unreliable, 
so did LTNs from the early 18th century attack popular empirical discourse, revealing it to have 
only an assumed association with true content. This cultural climate produced LTNs that 
articulated the genre’s most virulent critiques at the expense of their own textual stability. 
I open this chapter with an examination of the Royal Society’s linguistic project in order 
to demonstrate how that project developed and circulated a binary perspective of fact and fiction. 
Then, I examine the changes that this perspective prompted in the LTN genre, tracking the 
emergence of its satire of scientific discourse through three texts: David Russen’s Iter Lunare 
(1703), Daniel Defoe’s The Consolidator (1705), and Murtagh McDermot’s A Trip to the Moon 
(1728). I hope to demonstrate how in this historical moment, the LTN’s indeterminacy began to 





The Royal Society’s Systematized Discourse: Fact vs. Fiction 
As the LTNs previously discussed were being written or translated into English in the 
mid-to-late 17th century, the nature of scientific inquiry was shifting as empiricism made itself 
felt in society. In the 1650s and 1660s, “the Scientific Revolution reached a state of 
consolidation,” and professional societies dedicated to the pursuit of empirical knowledge sprang 
up across Europe (Dear 145). 1660 saw the founding of England’s own Royal Society of London 
for Improving Natural Knowledge (“Thomas Sprat”). While this organization functioned within 
the established tradition of empiricism, it systematized empirical discourse to establish its 
authority and by doing so, became the face of empiricism in the public eye. 
The Royal Society sought to differentiate itself from scholarly tradition by inverting the 
received relationship between ancient authority and immediate experience in intellectual writing. 
Traditional scholarly conventions required writers to reference the works of revered figures from 
antiquity in order to legitimate their own ideas. As historian of science Peter Dear notes, 
“‘ancient authority’… was located in authoritative texts,” and these texts “determined the 
character and function of statements of general experience,” which were originally phrased as 
sweeping statements about what generally was found to be true, and not conveyed as a report of 
any specific incident (Dear 149). However, in establishing themselves as the new authority, the 
Royal Society elevated experience above textual references and changed how experience was 
conveyed in writing. Instead of providing “generalized statement[s] about how some aspect of 
the world behaves,” they provided “report[s] of how, in one instance, the world had behaved” – 




To emphasize the immediacy of recorded experiences, the Royal Society developed a 
plain style of writing to use in its reports. The Society’s discourse incorporated features of 
previous empirical works; for instance, reports described discrete events and incorporated visual 
descriptions and circumstantial details such as time and place to establish that they had actually 
occurred (Dear 154). However, the Society also established new stylistic conventions. For 
example, it drew significance from the voice of its writing. If an observation took place in the 
context of an arranged experiment, the passive voice was employed to describe how it was set 
up, and a recipe-like set of instructions outlined this procedure (Dear 153). To demarcate clearly 
the moment of observation from the list of instructions, the active first-person voice – the 
“empirical I” – was often reserved for the moment of observation (Dear 153). Combining 
familiar and new conventions into a strict formal system, the Royal Society’s discourse can be 
seen as a deliberate codification of the existing empirical discursive tradition. 
Empirical discourse had originally arisen by incorporating elements of fiction via 
speculation and theory, as my previous analysis has shown. However, the Royal Society 
attempted to trim all fictional elements from its particular version of empirical discourse. It 
arranged fact and fiction as a false binary in order to encourage a singular association of its 
discourse with fact, an association that LTNs would eventually critique.  
One can see this fact-fiction binary at work in Thomas Sprat’s 1667 History of the Royal 
Society. The Society imagines its discourse as opposing fictional styles, as is evident when Sprat 
writes that its members “have endeavour’d to separate the knowledge of Nature from the colours 
of Rhetorick, the devices of Fancy, or the delightful deceit of fables” (62). In the opinion Sprat 
here demonstrates, literary devices are to be purged from the society’s discourse; he “openly 




kept resolutely apart” (Cartwright and Baker 81). Sprat similarly disdains “the luxury and 
redundance [sic] of speech” and aligns such perceived flaws with literary fiction by mentioning 
the “trick of Metaphors” and referring to rhetoric as “this beautiful Deceit” (111, 112, 112). He 
characterizes the Society’s discourse as contrastingly “reject[ing] all the amplifications, 
digressions, and swellings of style,” consisting of “a close, naked, natural way of speaking; 
positive expressions, clear senses, a native easiness bringing all things as near the mathematical 
plainness as they can,” and “deliver[ing] so many things almost in an equal number of words” 
(Sprat 113). As Godwin’s Gonsales praises experience at the expense of the “Vanities, fansies, 
[and] Dreames” of theory (65), Sprat arranges a fact-fiction binary by encouraging readers to 
associate the Royal Society’s new writing style solely with true content. 
This fact-fiction binary is not only visible in the way the Society imagined its discourse, 
but also in the divisive way it employed it. For instance, in barring all speculation from its new 
discourse, the Royal Society frowned upon reports that included hypotheses (Dear 157). While 
hypotheses have since become an integral part of the scientific method, by hypothesizing in a 
report, the writer steps out of his prescribed role as observer to make arguments not based on 
immediate evidence (Dear 157). Dear cites Henry Power’s quotation of Boyle as explaining the 
contemporary bias against this practice: 
When a writer…acquaints me onely with his own thoughts or conjectures, without 
inriching his discourse with any real Experiment or Observation, if he be 
mistaken in his Ratiotination, I am in some danger of erring with him… But if a 
Writer endevours, by delivering new and real Observations or Experiments, to 
credit his Opinions, the case is much otherwayes; for, let his Opinions be never so 
false (his Experiments being true) I am not obliged to believe the former, and am 





Boyle situates the “thoughts,” “conjectures,” and “Opinions” of hypotheses as unreliable (“I am 
in danger of erring with him”) in contrast to experiments, painted in broad strokes as “being 
true.” Thus, Boyle propagates the Royal Society’s perspective of fact and fiction as a binary in 
order to discredit hypotheses and encourage a reliance solely on observation. 
The Royal Society’s fact-fiction binary often encouraged scientists to invent fictions to 
meet the organization’s strict discursive standards. In the Society’s publications, “the absence of 
a discrete experience as the culmination of [a] report” would “[deprive] it of proper credentials” 
(Dear 153). To adhere to this prescribed form, Sir Isaac Newton completely fabricated the 
famous anecdote where he is said to have held up a prism and see it split a beam of light into 
various colors; on the contrary, these ideas were based on thirty years of research and were not 
defined by a single observable moment (Dear 154-155). However, the Royal Society’s 
conventions required articles considered for publication to revolve around a single moment of 
observation, so “[Newton] gave the Society just the sort of thing which it required – an event, in 
which he was the central participant” (Dear 155). Great irony lies in the fact that Newton was 
forced to invent a “spurious description” (Dear 155) – putting it more bluntly, to lie – in order to 
have already well-supported but theoretical ideas accepted by the Royal Society. The fictional 
elements of empirical discourse here demonstrate how necessary they are to the scientific 
perspective by functioning as a vacuum: the Royal Society’s attempt to exclude theory and 
speculation necessitated the creation of fictions to fill that gap. The example of Newton’s prism 
demonstrates how the Society’s strict adherence to its seemingly truthful discourse generated 
indirect effects that compromised the purported purely factual status of its publications. 
Despite the composite status of their publications, the Society encouraged a perception of 




taking, the Society imposed an exclusive fact-fiction binary by suggesting that accounts that used 
the new empirical style were all true and accounts that did not were all unreliable. The Society 
set itself up for critique by LTNs by deriving believability solely from form and not from 
content. 
Believability is formulated in this way in the Society’s 1667 prescriptive pamphlet, 
Directions For Observations and Experiments to be made by Masters of Ships, Pilots, and other 
fit Persons in their Sea-Voyages. It aims “to draw up some Directions for Seamen, the better to 
capacitate them for making such Observations abroad, as might be pertinent and suitable to the 
[Society’s] purposes” – in other words, to standardize sailors’ writing so that the Society can 
regard their notes as dependable sources by their exclusive new standards of authority 
(Directions 434). The pamphlet instructs sailors “to keep an exact Diary of [their] observations 
and Experiments,” asking them not only “to remark curiously” specific topographical features, 
but also “to measure and describe the same Exactly” (Directions 434, 439, 439). It describes how 
to take various measurements and includes tables and written records of experiments as models. 
By specifying not only what but also how sailors should observe, the pamphlet demands that 
sailors use the new discourse in order that their observations be taken seriously. 
The pamphlet encourages the use of the new discourse by suggesting that travel accounts 
that use it are all reliable, whereas older accounts that do not are to be distrusted. Thus, the 
pamphlet imposes a fact-fiction binary on other texts to correlate formal differences with 
different levels of believability, biasing readers in the Society’s favor. The pamphlet challenges 
the authority of a conventional travel account most directly when it asks sailors to investigate 
“whether in some places of the Sea, there be any sweet Water at the Bottom,” a phenomenon 




…the Affirmative whereof is to be met with in the East-Indian Voyages of Van 
Linschoten, who pag. 16 of that work, as ‘tis Englished, records, that in the 
Perisian Gulf, about the Isle of Barbarem, they fetch up with certain Vessels 
(which he describes not) Water out of the Sea, from under the Salt-Water, four or 
five fathom deep, as Sweet as any Fountain-water. (Directions 447-448)  
 
This passage’s rhetoric subtly denigrates Van Linschoten’s account. The parenthetical “which he 
describes not” does not critique the content of his observations as being unbelievable, but rather 
attacks the form in which he conveys them, suggesting it does not include enough details to be 
considered reliable by the Royal Society’s standards. The phrasing of the sweet-water’s location 
as “four or five fathom deep” also paints the travel account as inaccurate; a fathom measures six 
feet, so this would have been a significant range of error (“fathom, n.”). Similarly, the inexact 
location conveyed in “about the Isle of Barbarem” also critiques the account’s form as lacking 
the Society’s prerequisite descriptive accuracy. By snubbing Van Linschoten’s account for 
lacking precision and detail, the Royal Society’s pamphlet characterizes travel accounts that do 
not use its new discourse as unreliable and inferior to those that do. 
A later pamphlet, General Heads for the Natural History of a Country Great or Small 
Drawn Out for the Use of Travellers and Navigators (1692), more directly impugns the 
reliability of older travel accounts to the advantage of new reports that employ the Society’s 
discourse. Written by Robert Boyle, a prominent member of the Royal Society, this pamphlet 
consists of lists of questions for travelers to investigate, organized by country. Its first list 
concerns Turkey and begins with a passage that lampoons the reliability of previous accounts: 
Though we have by Journal-Books a fuller Account given us of Turky [sic] than 
of many other Countries, yet because there are in these but imperfect Relations of 





This passage further exposes the relationship between the style and reliability of travel accounts 
cultivated by the Royal Society. The ample extant accounts of Turkey are rejected as unreliable 
not because of their content, but because of their form: they are “imperfect Relations” (Boyle 
58). The passage aims to replace these “imperfect relations” by guiding its readers in recording 
observations in the accepted style. For instance, when Boyle asks travelers to investigate a 
poisonous Hungarian lake whose fumes are reputed to knock birds out of the air, he requests 
them to pursue ample details surrounding the phenomenon, specifically “what are the particulars 
of this as to Taste, Smell, Colour, Heat or Cold; whether any Waters run into it, and what 
Minerals are found near about it, to which these Qualities can be mostly attributed” (84). The 
addition of such details would establish reports as reliable by the Royal Society’s standards. 
The phenomena the pamphlet’s questions concern range in believability from plausible to 
unbelievable, bolstering the perception of the Royal Society’s discourse as factual by 
comparison. The pamphlet’s questions concern phenomena ranging from the likely (“Whether 
Birds and wild Beasts grow white [in Poland] in Winter-Time, and recover their Native Colour in 
Summer” (78)) to the improbable (“What Truth there is in that Relation, of Swallows being 
found under Waters, congeal'd in Winter, and reviving if they be fish'd and held to the Fire” (75-
76)) to the overtly fictional (“To enquire whether the Appearance of Legs and Arms of Men, 
related to stand out of the Ground, to a great Number, at five Miles from Cairo, on Good Friday, 
do still continue, and how that Imposture is performed” (72)). This range orients the Society’s 
reports in opposition to both previous travel accounts’ plausible claims and to overtly fictional 
rumors. By mingling these together, the text encourages readers to perceive even plausible 




The Royal Society elicits belief in many of its publications by employing a binary view 
of fact and fiction, and as such texts popularized this view, they inspired changes in LTNs. This 
is not surprising, as LTNs exist as indeterminate composites in the middle space between fact 
and fiction, the categories that the Royal Society viewed as mutually exclusive. Likely because 
of this, LTNs began to critique the putative association of the Royal Society’s discourse with 
truth by employing it in their overtly fictional narratives. However, this literary shift didn’t 
happen at the flip of a switch. One can see satire emerge as the dominant mode in LTNs by 
examining multiple LTNs from the early 18th century and noting how they increasingly critique 
the scientific discourse they employ. Such an examination also sheds light on the contemporary 
status of fact and fiction by chronicling two incompatible ways in which it was formulated: as 
the Royal Society’s clear-cut binary and LTNs’ blurry spectrum. 
 
David Russen’s Iter Lunare: Indeterminacy Grows Uncomfortable 
Indeterminate LTNs encountered problems as they attempted to fit into each of the Royal 
Society’s mutually exclusive categories of fact and fiction simultaneously, as David Russen’s 
Iter Lunare, or a Voyage to the Moon (1703) demonstrates. A response to de Bergerac’s satirical 
LTN Voyage Dans La Lune [A Trip to the Moon], Iter Lunare is unique in that its indeterminacy 
derives from its attempt to separate factual and fictional strands of de Bergerac’s work in 
response to the imposition of a binary perspective. In comparison to The Man in the Moone’s 
indeterminacy, Iter Lunare’s indeterminacy is much tenser and treated as problematic. 
Like Godwin’s Epistle, Iter Lunare’s Preface elicits competing serious and satirical 




serious and reasonable “Tract” that “will find Approbation from the Learned and Ingenious” 
(Russen, A2). However, he switches tactics by including folk-cultural references to the moon: 
I know you may as soon perswade [sic] some that the Moon is made of a Green 
Cheese, as that it is a kind of Sea and Earth, of Land and Water. …They look 
upon the Notion of its being Peopled a Romance; though from their Infancy they 
have had the Tradition of the Man in the Moon, who, some will tell you, carries a 
Bundle of Bushes on his Back. (Russen A2) 
 
 
In contrast to the opening lines, this passage’s logic and rhetoric encourage a fictional reading of 
Iter Lunare. Its parallel statements suggest that if readers take Russen’s arguments seriously, 
they should also believe in the Man in the Moon and that the moon is made of green cheese. 
Thus, the Preface’s folk-cultural references “[suggest] that [Russen’s] narrative is just a tale for 
children” and  “[introduce] a note of irony into his seemingly serious treatment of [de Bergerac]” 
(Capoferro 175). The very comparison of cultural fictions and scientific conjectures tints science 
with fictional connotations, as did Kepler’s use of the Man in the Moon in his Conversation. 
Russen recognizes the composite status of his own text in his Preface’s final lines, referring to it 
as being “composed of serious Philosophical Reflections, intermixed with variety of diverting 
Thought” (A3). The text thus establishes and recognizes its indeterminacy in its first paragraphs. 
 Iter Lunare struggles with its source material in trying to fit de Bergerac’s indeterminate 
text into a fact-fiction binary. Early on, Russen suggests that the contemporary title of de 
Bergerac’s work, Selenarchia: or, the Government of the World in the Moon: A Comical History 
(Bowen v), should employ the word “serious” instead of “comical.” Russen outlines his thusly: 
…the Title that the Translator gives it (when he calls it a Comical History) seems 
to be too full of Levity, and unbecoming that Gravity which a Treatise of so 
serious Matter doth require. For though it be interlaced with much Matter of 
Mirth, Wit and Invention, of things either doubtful, or meerly feigned, and so in 




Romantick Whymseys, or Poor Robin’s Description of Lubbardland; yet it is 
throughout carried on with that strength of Argument, force of Reason, and 
solidity of Judgment in the Demonstration of things probable, that it may not be 
unbecoming the Gravity of Cato, the Seriousness of Seneca, or the Strictness of 
the most rigid Peripatetick or Cartesian; and instead of Comical, may deserve the 
Epithete of the most Rational History of the Government of the Moon. (2-4) 
 
 
The passage catalogues the work with both famous fictional works and serious philosophical 
musings, suggesting that Russen views de Bergerac’s narrative as an indeterminate text. While 
he regards it as serious scientific speculation in the quotation above, Russen later categorizes de 
Bergerac’s text with other LTNs and describes them as purely fictional in other passages, saying 
“As for the Story of those, who with our Author, pretend to have went [to the moon], they are 
feigned Relations, under which they have endeavoured [sic] to teach us probable, yet doubtful, 
Principles” (61). Unsure of how to catalogue de Bergerac’s work, Russen’s text demonstrates the 
fault line emerging between fact and fiction as it too becomes indeterminate in its response. 
Iter Lunare’s relationship with empirical discourse also bifurcates between poles of 
obedient usage and open critique, making it one of the first LTNs to question its own scientific 
discourse. In certain passages, Russen demands detailed accounts and experimental proof of de 
Bergerac’s claims, adopting the Royal Society’s discursive standards. For example, responding 
to de Bergerac’s narrator’s claim to have floated using bottles of rarified dew, Russen “own[s]” 
that “the Sun will rarifie the Dew, and that shining through Glass, its heat is augmented, whereby 
the Dew will be more rarified,” but adds, “whether the heat of the Sun’s Beams will attract and 
raise the Vials upwards, is a Querry, of which, I think, as yet no Experiment hath been made” 
(51). In the first quotation, Russen twice employs the passive voice typical of the Royal 
Society’s discourse, while in the second, he demands experimentation for validation, another of 




moon by trapping vapors from a sacrifice in hermetically sealed jars, Russen remarks, “But till 
he informeth us what Smoak [sic] he put into them, or what Metal they were made of, we must 
defer our Censure of the natural Possibility of an Ascent by any such means” (84). He here 
withholds belief in the absence of adequate concrete details, another Royal Society standard.  
While these passages of Iter Lunare employ empirical discourse without critique, others 
complicate the text by critiquing empiricism for the way it prefaces immediate “sense” above 
theoretical “reason.” “‘Tis Reason, and not Sense, must judge of things above us,” Russen 
claims, “For should we measure all things by Sense, wherein should we differ from Brutes?” 
(102). Russen then praises those who use their reason, but notes that those who “credit nothing 
but what they see, or their Senses can conceive…degenerate into worse than Brutes, and become 
more unreasonable than those who have no Reason at all” (102). This critique somewhat 
implicates the text’s own empirical passages, subtly indicating the start of a strain of self-critical 
LTNs and further demonstrating the challenge indeterminate texts pose in a binary system. 
Unfortunately, criticism of Iter Lunare has not recognized its indeterminacy and remains 
divided into two opposing camps. Some critics, like Parrett, read the text as “a serious scientific 
consideration of the logistics of the lunar journey” presented in de Bergerac (66). “Where de 
Bergerac was satiric, Russen is serious,” asserts Mary Elizabeth Bowen (vi). Conversely, others 
hold the work to be subtly but pointedly satirical. Capoferro argues that no “mentally sane savant 
could have regarded Cyrano’s work as a handbook for empirical projectors,” and that the text’s 
“ironies and contradictions…rather make it a piece of mock-commentary” (175). Similarly, 
William Graves claims that “Russen mingles levity with serious satire” (8). Subjected only to an 





The status of Iter Lunare has not been resolved because it is fundamentally irresolvable; 
the text exists in a dynamic liminal space between naïve empiricism and extreme skepticism, 
serious and satirical modes, and fact and fiction. Recent criticism is beginning to admit this view; 
Capoferro is surely correct in describing Iter Lunare as a “fundamentally self-contradictory” and 
“highly ambivalent text,” and Parrett emphasizes these traits in noting that “Russen…occupies a 
liminal space between the scientist and the novelist” (Capoferro 176, 174; Parrett 70). As an 
indeterminate work that shakes the norm of mutually exclusive categorical thinking, Iter Lunare 
has greater significance than either prominent critical perspective has yet encompassed, and 
attests to early notes of self-satire that the Royal Society’s binary paradigm caused within LTNs. 
 
The Consolidator: Scientific Discourse as Satirical Mechanism  
Continuing the trend begun in Iter Lunare, Daniel Defoe’s LTN The Consolidator (1705) 
employs scientific discourse in its satire. It does not make this discourse the object of its satire, 
but instead uses it to satirize other targets such as religion and politics. “Parodying contemporary 
scientific discourse...enable[s] Defoe to attack the objects which he describes,” Mark Jordan 
argues in his master’s thesis; “[Defoe] ridicules this style only to attack his ulterior satiric 
targets; his satire is not directed at scientific writing itself, but at the political and religious 
controversies he describes with this scientific language” (9, 22-23). As scientific discourse is 
used as an instrument but not a target of satire in The Consolidator, we can view the work as a 
stepping stone between Iter Lunare’s alternating support and critique of scientific discourse, and 
later texts use of the discourse as both satirical instrument and target. The Consolidator thus 




Through his use of the word “transactions” in part of The Consolidator’s subtitle 
Memoirs of Sundry Transactions from the World in the Moon, Defoe encourages the direct 
comparison of his account with the Royal Society’s Philosophical Transactions (Jordan 6-7). 
The text bolsters this comparison through stylistic mimicry, as “sections of [The Consolidator] 
are similar in content and tone to popular scientific writings,” but function in “a playful and 
parodic manner” (Jordan 7). To demonstrate this stylistic parallel at work, Jordan compares 
Defoe’s description of the Consolidator, a fictional machine used for lunar transportation within 
the narrative and an allegorical representation of English Parliament, to passages from Robert 
Boyle’s description of a “New Pneumatical Engine” in New Experiments Physico-Mechanical 
Touching the Spirits of the Air (1660) (Boyle qtd. in Jordan 25). Here is Boyle’s description, its 
empirical style unmistakable: 
At the top of the vessel A, you may observe a round hole, whose diameter BC is 
of about four inches; and whereof the orifice is encircled with a lip of glass, 
almost an inch high.... 
The use of the lip is to sustain the cover delineated in the second figure; where DE 
points out a brass ring, so cast, as that it doth cover the lip BC of the first figure, 
and is cemented on, upon it, with a strong and close cement. (qtd. in Jordan 25) 
 
Compare the above to Defoe’s description of the Consolidator, 
…a certain Engine formed in the shape of a Chariot, on the Backs of two vast 
Bodies with extended Wings, which spread about 50 Yards in Breadth, compos'd 
of Feathers so nicely put together, that no Air could pass… (36) 
 
Each of these passages consists of descriptive prose identifying different parts of each machine, 
and describing how they interact (Jordan 27). Note too that both employ the passive voice. As in 
the comparison between Godwin’s diagram of his flying Engine and diagrams of real machines, 




machine, where Defoe’s describes a fictional invention. Defoe thus complicates the Royal 
Society’s fact-fiction binary by using its discourse to describe a machine that does not exist, 
disrupting the discourse’s association with true content and setting the stage for satire. 
Defoe uses scientific discourse to satirize the English government from a safe distance. 
The Consolidator has specifically 513 feathers, the number of members in the English Parliament 
(Defoe 37). Defoe’s narrator says that “the Quill or Head of every Feather is or ought to be full 
of a vigorous Substance, which gives Spirit, and supports the brightness and colour of the 
Feather” (47-48). He critiques Parliament in saying that despite this, a few are “exceeding empty 
and dry; and the Humid being totally exhal'd, those Feathers grow very useless and insignificant 
in a short time,” while others “are so full of Wind…[and thus] so fleet, so light, and so 
continually fluttering and troublesome, that they greatly serve to disturb [the Consolidator] and 
keep the Motion unsteddy” (Defoe 48). Allegorically mocking Parliament’s members as feathers 
allows Defoe to criticize them in ways that would otherwise incur punishment. 
Defoe also uses empirical inventions like the telescope as a mechanism of satire. On the 
moon, his narrator discovers glasses that allow “strange things, which pass in our World for 
Non-Entities…to be seen, and very perceptible; for Example: State Polity, in all its Meanders, 
Shifts, Turns, Tricks, and Contraries…” (Defoe 73). Making state policy the object of visual 
observation, Defoe critiques its needless complexity when his narrator declares that “State 
Policy…requires vast Volumes to descend to the Particulars of, and huge Diagrams, Spheres, 
Charts, and a Thousand nice things to display” (82). After all this work, “all the vast 
Contradictions are made Rational, reconciled to Practice, and brought down to Demonstration” 
(82). This set-up allows Defoe to introduce points of contention with contemporary 




spend 5000 l. to be Chosen, that cannot get a Groat Honestly by setting there” (83). Empirical 
inventions thus help Defoe to satirize the English government by acting as allegorical barriers. 
The Consolidator uses scientific discourse and technology as the mechanism, not the 
target, of its satire. We can thus see scientific discourse’s place in the LTN growing more and 
more involved with critique. In the next text discussed, this tension finally cracks and results in a 
text satirizing its own discourse, becoming utterly unstable.  
 
McDermot’s A Trip to the Moon: A Cretan Paradox of Self-Satire 
LTNs articulate their strongest critique of the Royal Society’s scientific discourse and its 
purported association with truth by satirizing their own prose and destabilizing their own 
narratives. As with Defoe’s Consolidator, they disrupt the association between scientific 
discourse and true content by using the discourse to promote obvious impossibilities. However, 
the contradictions generated work to critique the discourse not as a distant target, but at work in 
their own prose. Like the paradox of the Cretan liar that Lucian’s original LTN evoked, these 
most satirical LTNs embed a vicious circle of self-contradiction directly into their prose. 
Murtagh McDermot’s 1728 A Trip to the Moon critiques the Royal Society’s scientific 
discourse in this manner. Despite its narrator’s claim that readers should “not expect…much 
Rhetorick” since he is “studious to deliver the Truth,” he uses empiricist discourse ironically and 
satirically to highlight his own language’s ability to deceive (McDermot 90). Such deception is 
made overt when the narrator claims to have learned the lunar language in a single night:  
[My tutor] took a large and correct Dictionary, and minc’d the Leaves of it; those he 




Part parallel to the Horizon, upon a gentle Fire, where he let it remain thirty-nine 
Minutes. The Air which was inclos’d in the Vessel, being put into a violent Motion 
by the Heat of the Fire, together with the Motion of the Water, soon reduc’d the 
minc’d Leaves to a Consistence of Jelly. The Vessel had been cover’d so closely, to 
hinder any of the Letters from being carried off in Vapours, and that the Air in the 
upper part of the Vessel might act with the greater Force. (McDermot 15) 
 
At this point in the passage, the decidedly scientific, detailed way in which the narrator is 
describing the process of creating the jellied dictionary elicits belief, even though certain details 
like the possibility of “the Letters being carried off in Vapours” tip readers off to the absurdity of 
this process (McDermot 15). The narrator then consumes the jelly and falls asleep. His tutor 
watches him during the night, and reports in the morning having been “wonderfully delighted to 
hear [him] break Wind in [his] Sleep; sometimes with all the force of Rhetorick, sometimes in 
the Tone of a Grammarian” (McDermot 15). In associating inflated, rhetorical speech with 
passing gas, the author undermines his previously serious, believable use of scientific discourse 
earlier in the same paragraph. This contradictory maneuver cracks the text along a fault line of 
believability and skepticism, leaving readers delighted. In response to this rupture, the author 
uses humor to smooth over the division and keep the text coherent. Ostentatiously contradictory 
in its attitudes toward discourse, this passage reveals the association of the Royal Society’s 
discourse with true content to be an empty one. 
By using famous empirical phrases to contradict the source material from which they 
originate, McDermot’s text further emphasizes that scientific discourse is a separate entity from 
the truths it can convey, and may be used to promote even the most impossible notions. For 
instance, the narrator’s description of seeing “a Property of A Body…subsist without a Body” 
brings to mind Locke’s discussion of senses in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding in 




mind several distinct perceptions of [them]” (McDermot 71; Locke 51). However, McDermot 
borrows Locke’s discourse while contradicting his ideas: where McDermot claims to observe a 
body-less property, Locke asserts that properties must stem from bodies. One of McDermot’s 
characters justifies this obvious impossibility in arguing that “it is as possible for a Property to 
subsist without a Body, as for nothing to have any Property. Yet some have affirm’d that nothing 
hath Properties, when they say that a Shadow is a Nigrum Nihil, or a Black Nothing” (McDermot 
71). Significantly, this proposed solution relies on language in order to prove the impossible, 
further underscoring how language that contains the ability to deceive. 
Similarly, when ascending to the moon in a whirlwind, the narrator claims, “putting both 
my Hands against [a Cloud full of Hail], by all Strength, I caus’d it to re-act upon me as much as 
I acted upon it,” echoing the famous phrasing of Newton’s third law of motion as stated in his 
Principia, “To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction” (McDermot 10; Newton 
83). As it is impossible to rebound off of a cloud, a gaseous object, McDermot uses Newton’s 
own language to add weight to a purely sophistic argument. Each of these examples highlights 
how even the most recognizably empiricist rhetoric is falsely associated with truth, as it can be 
used to promote lies and factual information equally well.  
The satirical strain of LTNs reached its apex with self-criticism like McDermot’s, but the 
genre could not sustain these unstable critiques. It eventually retreated toward the stability of 







Chapter Four: From Indeterminacy to Science Fiction 
Having amplified their satire at the price of their stability, LTNs’ trenchant critiques of 
scientific discourse eventually waned. The instability of self-satirizing narratives made them 
impossible to sustain, and their target – scientific discourse’s association with true content – was 
becoming a cultural standard that was difficult to critique without making the audience 
uncomfortable. My final chapter chronicles this generic transition to prepare for concluding 
remarks on the different trajectories of the novel and the LTN. I track the diminution of LTNs’ 
critique of empirical discourse as it appears in increasingly subtle forms until eventually 
subsiding altogether when the genre is absorbed into modern science fiction.  
My discussion first examines how Samuel Brunt’s A Voyage to Cacklogallinia (1727) 
offers a weakened critique of scientific discourse by enveloping it with silly fictive elements. I 
then analyze how Edgar Allan Poe’s Hans Pfaall—A Tale (1835) uses a similar method to reveal 
the discourse’s ability to make hoaxes appear authentic; however, the text satirizes not its hoax’s 
discourse but the characters naïve enough to believe it. I posit Richard Adam Locke’s Moon 
Hoax of 1835 – the first LTN to be widely believed – as a tipping point in the genre; in this text, 
scientific discourse’s associations combine with a newspaper context so that instead of fiction 
critiquing scientific discourse, that discourse legitimates fiction. I then examine the differences 
between the 1835 and 1840 editions of Hans Pfaall to reveal the effect Locke’s hoax had on the 
genre. I conclude by examining Jules Verne’s From the Earth to the Moon Direct in Ninety-
Seven Hours and Twenty Minutes, and a Trip Round It (1874). I consider how LTNs’ satirical 
critiques are silenced as the trope of lunar travel is quarantined within science fiction, a genre 
which relies on stable categories of fact and fiction instead of critiquing them. Tracing out the 




A Voyage to Cacklogallinia: Science from the Mouths of Chickens 
For a wonderful example of the weakening critique of scientific discourse in LTNs, we 
can turn to Samuel Brunt’s A Voyage to Cacklogallinia (1727), a satire whose “suggestion of the 
growing scientific temper of modern times makes it much more than mere fantasy” (Nicholson 
“Introduction,” x-xi). While it satirizes politics, Cacklogallinia never overtly undercuts its 
scientific discourse; instead, it uses a ridiculous character as a fictional mouthpiece for scientific 
discourse. By examining how fiction envelops fact in this text, we can identify how its critique of 
scientific discourse weakens in an attempt to preserve textual stability, evidence that scientific 
discourse was becoming more culturally engrained.  
Brunt’s story opens with the narrator’s shipwreck and discovery of a species of seven-
foot-tall chicken people called the Cacklogallinians. These ridiculous beings act as the vehicle of 
the text’s satire by demonstrating the faults of contemporary English society. For instance, 
Brunt’s narrator reports that Cacklogallinian lawyers “…always, in Order to promote the 
Business of their own Profession, contrive [laws] in ambiguous Terms; so that…a double 
Meaning runs thro' every Sentence” (Brunt 89). In contrast to this, he idealizes English lawyers, 
saying they “come directly to the Merits of the Cause, and never endeavour by their Rhetorick to 
put a fair Face on a bad one” (Brunt 50). The satiric relationship between the Cacklogallinians 
and Brunt’s claims is emphasized throughout the text, as when the Cacklogallinian leader 
remarks, “…it is certain [England] must have copy'd [its] Policy from us” (Brunt 44). 
While Cacklogallinia contains overt satire, it takes scientific discourse seriously. The 
lunar travel element of the story is introduced when one enterprising Cacklogallinian projector 




arguing for its plausibility, as in previous narratives, the narrator remains the single skeptical 
figure objecting to the plan, arguing that “the extream Coldness of the Air,” “its great Subtlety,” 
and “the Distance [from Earth to the moon]” will prevent the plan’s success (Brunt 115). The 
narrator thus encompasses the LTNs’ satirical impulses, and is eventually convinced, suggesting 
that the text does not criticize scientific discourse. 
On the surface of the text, this appears to be true: the projector responds to the narrator’s 
objections with scientifically plausible reasoning in an appropriate (if overwrought) empirical 
discourse. At one point, he paraphrases Galileo, declaring the moon to be “an opaque solid Body, 
as is our Earth,” that has “a body whose Surface is rugged and uneven” (Brunt 112, 113). Both 
the content and the wording of these phrases evoke Sidereus Nuncius. Similarly, the projector 
computes the weight of “condens’d Air which encompasses the Earth on every Part,” stating that 
it “weighs about 108 Liparia’s on a Square Inch”; the narrator interrupts in a parenthetical to 
explain that “Liparia is near a Sixth of our Pound” (Brunt 116). While the math is here converted 
from fictive units, this mixture of fiction with fact does not undermine or satirize. Rather, 
Nicolson emphasizes the passage for its accuracy, noting that “Brunt was clearly aware of the 
work of many scientists, notably Boyle, upon the nature and rarefaction of the air” 
(“Introduction” xiv). Cacklogallinia thus portrays scientific discourse as reliable. 
However, the story instantiates its critique by having a seven-foot-tall chicken articulate 
this serious discourse. This contextualizes scientific discourse within a silly fictional element to 
undercut its seriousness and contaminate it with fiction. This criticism functions by separating 
fact and fiction into text and context, demonstrating an effect of the Royal Society’s binary 
perspective. Similarly, the subtlety of the critique reveals how the discourse’s associations with 




not sharply critique scientific discourse like previous LTNs, but only pokes fun at the figures of 
scientists by making a talking chicken empiricism’s mouthpiece. Later texts reprise this tactic of 
employing text and context to separate fact and fiction, resulting in even weaker satires.  
 
Hans Pfaall--A Tale (1835): The Narrator Hoaxed 
As in Cacklogallinia, Edgar Allan Poe’s Hans Pfaall--A Tale (1835) achieves its satirical 
effects by embedding scientific discourse in a fictional context. However, where Cacklogallinia 
employs a ridiculous speaker as the fictional vehicle for scientific discourse, Hans Pfaall divides 
its text and context more completely by assigning discourses with factual and fictional 
connotations to two distinct narrators. As Kepler does in Somnium, Poe structures Hans Pfaall as 
a frame narrative, employing multiple narrators: Hans Pfaall, the main character and author of a 
scientific-sounding letter that constitutes most of the novella’s prose, and the implied, exterior 
narrator who tells the story in which the letter is received in a sillier fictional style. As in Lucian, 
tension emerges from the conflicting readings espoused by these two narrators.  
Because Pfaall aims to convince, scientific discourse is relatively unassailable when he is 
narrating; thus, Poe’s story cannot overtly critique scientific discourse as in previous texts like 
McDermot’s self-reflexive satire. Instead, Hans Pfaall demonstrates the successful use of 
scientific discourse in the perpetration of a hoax, and critiques the naïveté of characters like the 
implied narrator who believe it. This acceptance of scientific discourse’s association with true 
content represents a major change from previous LTNs, one that will eventually lead to the loss 




Hans Pfaall’s first pages establish the implied narrator as naïve and impressionable. That 
he believes Pfaall’s fantastic claims is made clear before he relates them, as he opens the story by 
proclaiming that in the Dutch borough of Rotterdam, “phenomena have…occurred of a nature so 
completely unexpected, so entirely novel, so utterly at variance with pre-conceived opinions, as 
to leave no doubt on my mind that long ere this all Europe is in an uproar, all Physics in a 
ferment, all Dynamics and Astronomy together by the ears” (Poe 42). This hysteric style clashes 
with relatively calm content, as exemplified by the townspeople’s reaction to seeing a mysterious 
object approaching in the sky: 
…so, as nothing more reasonable could be done, every one to a man replaced his 
pipe carefully in the corner of his mouth, and, cocking up his right eye towards 
the phenomenon, puffed, paused, waddled about, and grunted significantly—then 
waddled back, grunted, paused, and finally—puffed again. (Poe 43) 
 
The humorous contrast here elicited between the narrator’s frenetic style and the relatively 
reserved actions of the townspeople highlights the difference between form and content – a 
difference required to detect Pfaall’s hoax and one to which the narrator is blind. Beginning his 
story with this goofy mismatched section, Poe envelops Pfaall’s scientific-sounding letter with 
overt fiction. In doing so, he encourages readers to regard Pfaall’s letter as fiction when it is 
reproduced verbatim in the text, even though the narrator dubs it an “extraordinary, and indeed 
very serious, communication” (Poe 47). 
 The narrator is right: this is a “serious” communication - stylistically. As Hans Pfaall 
begins narrating the letter, a significant shift in discourse accompanies the shift in narrators. 
Where the story’s introduction is styled as comedic fiction, the letter pulls out all stops to be 




its scientific discourse. Few elements of Pfaall’s letter itself reveal its fictional status, leaving his 
hoax to be exposed by evidence raised against it in the frame narrative after the letter concludes. 
  Pfaall’s letter employs scientific discourse to elicit belief. For instance, after he reveals 
his intention to travel to the moon, he explains how he will surmount the three main difficulties 
preventing lunar travel: “the moon’s…distance from the earth,” the loss of “atmospheric air,” 
and the bleeding and disorientation experienced by balloonists who ascend to high altitudes (Poe 
60, 62, 67). While discussing these points, Pfaall makes excessive use of empirical discourse, as 
in the following excerpt in which he discusses the moon’s distance from earth: 
Now, the mean or average interval between the centres of the two planets is 
59.9643 of the earth's equatorial radii, or only about 237,000 miles. I say the 
mean or average interval. But it must be borne in mind that the form of the moon's 
orbit being an ellipse of eccentricity amounting to no less than 0.05484 of the 
major semi-axis of the ellipse itself, and the earth's centre being situated in its 
focus, if I could, in any manner, contrive to meet the moon, as it were, in its 
perigee, the above mentioned distance would be materially diminished. (Poe 61) 
 
This passage represents a significant discursive shift from the story’s initial pipe-smoking humor 
and hysterical narrator. Its use of the passive voice, numerical data, and jargon without any 
explanatory definitions amounts to a demonstration of empirical intelligence meant to solicit 
belief; Pfaall’s scientific discourse mimics that found in reliable works of astronomy, even 
though it overplays its hand.  What’s more, Pfaall’s calculations are quite accurate. By using 
what Poe refers to in a footnote as “theory…urged in a mere spirit of banter,” Hans Pfaall 
establishes himself as a reliable narrator before claiming to have traveled to the moon (67). 
Pfaall elicits further belief by recording his observations in an empirical style like that 
prescribed by the Royal Society to travelers over a century earlier. This style is evident when 




Looking at my watch, I found it six o'clock. I was still rapidly ascending, and my 
barometer gave a present altitude of three and three-quarter miles. Immediately 
beneath me in the ocean, lay a small black object, slightly oblong in shape, 
seemingly about the size, and in every way bearing a great resemblance to one of 
those childish toys called a domino. Bringing my telescope to bear upon it, I 
plainly discerned it to be a British ninety four-gun ship, close-hauled, and pitching 
heavily in the sea with her head to the W.S.W. (Poe 60) 
 
Citing three instruments, two numeric readings and a directional heading for the ship, this 
passage demonstrates how Pfaall includes in each of his observations the empirical benchmarks 
that the Royal Society made prerequisites for believable accounts. Once in space, Pfaall adjusts 
the form of his observations to elicit further belief by “determin[ing] to keep a journal of [his] 
passage” (Poe 82); after this point in the narrative until he claims to land on the moon, Pfaall 
divides his prose into dated entries, trying to appear plausible by mimicking the form of 
empirical journals. As in Lucian, Pfaall also withholds observations to make those that he does 
provide appear authentic. Realizing that he will pass over the North Pole, Pfaall “lament[s] that 
[his] great elevation would…prevent [his] taking as accurate a survey as [he] could wish” (Poe 
86). By occasionally withholding observations and lamenting his inability to supply them in a 
way that meets empirical standards, Pfaall makes it seem as if the observations he does detail are 
credible. In these ways, Pfaall’s letter avails itself of the empirical emphasis placed upon direct 
visual observation and the reliability associated with information of this kind. 
Pfaall also characterizes himself as an objective, unemotional experimenter to appear 
reliable. He brings two pigeons and a cat with him to observe how changing atmospheric 
pressure affects the animals, and when the cat unexpectedly has kittens en route, Pfaall’s remarks 
demonstrate empiricism in action. He is “pleased at the occurrence” only because “it would 
afford [him] a chance of bringing to a kind of test the truth of a surmise” (Poe 72). After 




the kittens born in space, “Should the kittens be found to suffer uneasiness in an equal degree 
with their mother, I must consider my theory in fault, but a failure to do so I should look upon as 
a strong confirmation of my idea” (Poe 72). Pfaall regards the kittens solely as an opportunity for 
further experimentation; they remain mere test subjects when he “[f]or the sake of experiment 
[puts] the cat and kittens in a small basket, and suspend[s] it outside the car” (Poe 78). This 
eventually leads to an “awkward accident” in which the kittens and their mother plummet to 
Earth (Poe 81). Rather than show emotional remorse, Pfaall only regrets that their loss “deprived 
[him] of the insight into this matter which a continued experiment might have afforded” (Poe 
81). Pfaall’s unemotional response makes him seem like a reliable source of information, unlike 
the implied narrator, whose reports are full of emotion and little else. 
Poe also contrasts literary and scientific discourses to make Pfaall’s story appear 
plausible. When Pfaall has almost reached the lunar surface, he daydreams about what he will 
find there. Pfaall’s construction of the moon is fantastic, and the romantic style he briefly 
employs in this passage evokes a fictional literary tradition: 
Fancy revelled in the wild and dreamy regions of the moon. Imagination, feeling 
herself for once unshackled, roamed at will among the ever-changing wonders of 
a shadowy and unstable land. Now there were hoary and time-honored forests, 
and craggy precipices, and waterfalls tumbling with a loud noise into abysses 
without a bottom…. (Poe 80) 
 
This passage heralds a half of a page of dreamy musings that contrast sharply with Pfaall’s 
previous empirical style; there is emotion in these lines that is entirely absent when he recounts 
dropping his basket of cats. At the end of the passage, Pfaall swears off these “fancies” and the 
accompanying “horrors” with which he fills his unknown destination, refusing to “dwell upon 




my undivided attention” (Poe 80-81). Notably, the romantic-sounding “fancies” become 
scientific-sounding “speculations” as Pfaall returns to scientific discourse, underscoring the 
contrast between the romantic, imaginative style associated with the fictive musings of the 
excerpt and the “real and palpable” content of the rest of his empirical account. Thus, the 
romantic interlude works by contrast to align Pfaall’s scientific discourse with reality. 
As I’ve shown, Pfaall strategically manipulates the form of his letter in numerous ways to 
associate himself with empirical science; this has the effect of bolstering his credibility as a 
narrator. However, the letter’s conclusion suggests that Pfaall is manipulating his discourse 
consciously. He reveals ulterior motives when he tries to use his untold discoveries as capital in 
bartering for a pardon. “But my adventures yet remain to be related,” he states temptingly near 
the end of his letter, before dwelling at length on the variety of observations he has made 
regarding the moon and its inhabitants (Poe 99). After this, he concludes: 
But, to be brief, I must have my reward. …the price of any farther communication 
on my part—in consideration of the light which I have it in my power to throw 
upon many very important branches of physical and metaphysical science— I 
must solicit…a pardon for the crime of which I have been guilty in the death of 
the creditors upon my departure from Rotterdam. (Poe 100-101) 
 
This passage reveals Pfaall’s credibility to be crucial to his letter’s overall goal. Only if the letter 
convinces readers of its authenticity will they value the information Pfaall purports to reserve. 
As Pfaall’s letter concludes, the naive implied narrator takes over, receiving its claims 
with unadulterated belief. The President and Vice-President of the Rotterdam College of 
Astronomy also both believe Pfaall’s account, concluding that “[t]here was no doubt about the 
matter— the pardon should be obtained” (Poe 101). However, as the “lunar being” who 




supposedly resides on the moon. The astronomers thus conclude that “the pardon would be of 
little use, as no one but a man of the moon would undertake a voyage to so vast a distance” (Poe 
102). Thus, Pfaall’s hoax defeats itself. It does not achieve its ultimate goal because of the belief 
it engenders.  
 The believable discourse LTNs used was beginning to separate from the fictional 
markings that kept it quarantined and impossible to believe. This development eventually 
reached its peak in the Moon Hoax of 1835, the first LTN widely believed to be true. 
 
Locke’s Moon Hoax: “Factual” Discourse Legitimates Fiction  
The LTNs I have discussed each incorporate some fantastic element to critique scientific 
discourse’s association with truth, ensuring that though they contain gestures eliciting belief, 
they were never widely believed. However, that tradition changed on August 25th, 1835, when 
the penny daily newspaper the New York Sun ran the story “Great Astronomical Discoveries 
Lately Made by Sir John Herschel, L.L., D.F.R.S., &c., at the Cape of Good Hope” (Walsh 98). 
Though it was presented as an excerpt from the recently bankrupted Edinburgh Journal of 
Science, this was a fictional piece written by the paper’s science writer Richard Adams Locke. 
(Walsh 98). Taking Sir John Herschel the younger, a well-known real English astronomer, as its 
main character, the story attributes false discoveries to him, claiming that he has observed lunar 
creatures. The text employs scientific discourse and familiar rhetorical gestures in order to make 
its claims appear plausible. However, where previous LTNs combined fiction and fact to reveal 
how fiction could pass as fact, Locke’s story uses fact to bolster fiction and to actually pass it off 




the nickname “the Moon Hoax.” This result suggests that the association between scientific 
discourse and true content that LTNs traditionally critiqued had become so culturally engrained 
that it was now the dominant presence in texts composed of factual discourse and fictional 
content. Examining how fact legitimates fiction in Locke’s Moon Hoax reveals the strength of 
scientific discourse’s factual associations and explains why the work had such a profound effect 
on the LTN genre. 
 Fact legitimates fiction on a small scale when Locke first lists Herschel’s discoveries: 
…[Herschel] has already made the most extraordinary discoveries in every planet 
of our solar system; has discovered planets in other solar systems; has obtained a 
distinct view of objects in the moon, fully equal to that which the unaided eye 
commands of terrestrial objects at the distance of a hundred yards; has 
affirmatively settled the question whether this satellite be inhabited, and by what 
order of beings; has firmly established a new theory of cometary phenomena; and 
has solved or corrected nearly every leading problem of mathematical astronomy. 
(8-9, emphasis mine) 
 
In this inventory, Locke’s placement of the fictional element in the center of the list envelops it 
with more credible discoveries; the claims that the reader encounters first and last are plausible, 
so the paragraph takes on this connotation as a whole. Much in the manner that Cacklogallinia 
and Hans Pfaall enveloped scientific discourse with fiction, Locke inverts this orientation to 
envelop a fictional discovery with more plausible-sounding ones in order to pass it off as true. 
Locke’s narrative organization reprises this enveloping tactic on a larger scale. He opens 
with an eleven-page description of Herschel’s telescope detailing its construction and operation, 
noting, “We first avail ourselves of the documents which contain a description and history of the 
instrument by which these stupendous discoveries have been made. A knowledge of the one is 
essential to the credibility of the other" (Locke 9). Here, Locke directly anchors the plausibility 




opens with this section is significant: where Poe opens Hans Pfaall with a fiction that inspires 
skepticism, Locke begins with realistic description in order to make use of a similar effect, but in 
reverse. Just as Godwin prefaces Domingo Gonsales’s lunar journey with a description of the 
real island of St. Helena, Locke’s excessive description of Herschel’s telescope establishes his 
account as reliable by describing plausible things before it introduces fantastic content.  
Locke similarly bolsters his fiction with fact by contextualizing Herschel’s real work 
against other scientists’ before describing the lunar discoveries the story claims he has made. In 
detailing how his actual discoveries either corroborate or disprove those of other astronomers, he 
knits Herschel into a real network of reliable scientists, as in the following excerpt: 
The formation which Professor Frauenhofer uncharitably conjectured to be a lunar 
fortification, [Herschel] ascertained to be a tabular buttress of a remarkably 
pyramidical mountain; lines which had been whimsically pronounced roads and 
canals, he found to be keen ridges of singularly regular rows of hills; and that 
which Schroeter imagined to be a great city in the neighborhood of Marius, he 
determined to be a valley of disjointed rocks scattered in fragments, which 
averaged at least a thousand yards in diameter. (Locke 12) 
 
Here, Locke not only integrates Herschel’s supposed findings with other scientists’ work, but 
also characterizes Herschel as the more empirical figure, relying solely on observation instead of 
conjecture, as the other scientists do. (Gonsales used this same tactic on his way to the moon.) 
The choice of lunar subject matter also constitutes a rhetorically brilliant maneuver: that 
Herschel disproves theories of lunar life before he becomes the figure through which their 
“discovery” is articulated suggests that he is not out to fool anyone with misinformation. 
 Locke envelops his fiction with facts that aren’t there by alluding to redactions of 
nonexistent scientific material, reprising the tradition of withholding information begun by 




withholding from our readers the more generally and highly interesting discoveries which were 
made in the lunar world” (21). At other points in the narrative, however, the editor of the Sun 
justifies redactions by employing the expectations of the newspaper medium. For instance, when 
the account claims that Herschel has calculated the density of Saturn’s rings by “effect[ing] the 
following beautiful demonstration,” the editor conveniently interrupts, “[Which we omit, as too 
mathematical for popular comprehension.--Ed. Sun.]" (Locke 48). The narrative of the Moon 
Hoax concludes by alluding to a significant redaction: "[This concludes the Supplement, with the 
exception of forty pages of illustrative and mathematical notes, which would greatly enhance the 
size and price of this work, without commensurably adding to its general interest.--Ed Sun.]" 
(50). This reference closes the account on a plausible note, using the newspaper medium to 
justify the redaction as realistic and expected.  
While many of the Moon Hoax’s tactics can be seen as continuations or inversions of 
those identified in previous fictions, some of its elements were directly inspired by new trends in 
the era’s scientific climate. For instance, unlike previous LTNs, the Hoax portrays the 
cataloguing of lunar species in scientific taxonomies, reporting that “Dr. Herschel has classified 
not less than thirty-eight species of forest trees, and nearly twice this number of plants…Of 
animals, he classified nine species of mammalia, and five of ovipara” (Locke 31). It similarly 
reports that the observers “scientifically denominated [the lunar bat-people] the Vespertilio-
homo, or man-bat” (Locke 38). This bent toward relating not only discovery but taxonomic 
classification demonstrates the effect of work by scientists like Carl Linné (Linnaeus), whose 
1735 Systema Naturae aimed to organize all animals, plants, and minerals into categories as a 
way to generate knowledge. Soon after its publication, travel narratives adopted this paradigm; 




writing,” but those appearing in print before Linnaeus “were typically structured as appendices 
or formal digressions from the narrative,” while afterward, “the observing and cataloguing of 
nature itself become narratable. It could constitute a sequence of events, or even produce a plot. 
It could form the main storyline of an entire account” (27-28). The Moon Hoax is one such 
account, as its plot is solely based on looking at the moon.  
However, Locke’s rhetoric bridges the gap between visual observation and physical 
exploration. In lines such as "It was not, however, without regret that we left the splendid valley” 
and “masses of fallen crystals were found on every beach we explored,” Locke uses verbs that 
make it sound as if the lunar landscape is being physically explored instead of merely observed 
(28, 33). One may attribute this development to the popularization of works like Linnaeus’s, but 
also relate it to Galileo’s description of the lunar surface in Sidereus Nuncisus, where he uses 
tactile adjectives to make up for absent sensory evidence.  
While the Moon Hoax’s publication in a newspaper surely contributed to the widespread 
belief it inspired, one can tell that scientific discourse was also a significant factor by examining 
contemporary reviews and a parody of the story. On September 1st, the Sun published an 
addendum that addressed skeptics and included quotations taken from competing papers 
regarding the Hoax’s authenticity. One paper claimed that the hoax “appears to carry intrinsic 
evidence of being an authentic document,” while another imagined that it could “trace in it marks 
of transatlantic origin”; the New York Times similarly noted its discoveries to be “all probable 
and plausible, and have an air of intense verisimilitude” (Locke 61, 61, 62). These comments 
each attribute belief to the scientific discourse that the story employed to great effect – so great 
an effect that, as Copeland reports, a group of Yale University scholars visited the Sun’s office to 




could not find it in Yale’s library (140). Despite not obtaining the article, they, too, “concluded 
in a college debate that Herschel’s observations were, indeed, plausible,” further attesting to the 
strength of scientific discourse’s connotations (Copeland 141). 
One can also see that scientific discourse was a key feature associated with the hoax by 
examining how it was parodied in the Herald, a competing penny daily newspaper. While one 
can interpret this parody as a renewed, outright attack on the reliability of scientific discourse, 
one must realize that the opportunity to attack the discourse’s reliability was generated 
specifically by the hoax. In her doctoral thesis on the rhetoric of scientific media hoaxes, Lynda 
Walsh notes that “the parody of Locke’s story is a good barometer of what people paid attention 
to in the story” before delineating several features of the original story that it humorously 
overemphasized (115-116). These include “credentials/authority of foreign scientists,” (“In the 
title: ‘BY HERSCHELL, THE GRANDSON, L.L.D., F.R.S., R.F.L, P.Q.R., &C. &C. &C.’”) 
“astronomical jargon,” (“‘hydro, philo, solar, high pressure steam telescope’”) and “the “weight 
of scientific detail”,” as in the following excerpt:  
Herschell then tasted the water of said ocean, by means of a very long hydrostatic 
tube, attached to the telescope. It has a very curious taste. He found it was 
composed of the following mixture, viz: 2 parts of lemonade, 1 part printer’s ink, 
1-2 parts mint julep, 1-2 parts flower of brimstone. There was also a slight 
tincture of blue vitriol. (qtd. in Walsh 116) 
 
Based on these similarities, Walsh concludes that “authority, precision, and ‘verisimilar’ jargon” 
were crucial elements of contemporary science news articles (116). As Walsh summarizes Hugh 
Kenner as arguing, “the principal social benefit of a counterfeit is the hyper-awareness it confers 
upon its viewers, once they have recognized its artifice, of the “realness” of the object or skill the 




an opportunity to examine a rhetorical strategy of intervention by literary intellectuals in the 
process of scientific truth becoming public truth in America,” specifically, their attempt to 
“[criticize] the gaps in power between the literary and scientific communities” (Walsh 3). 
However, this would be the last critical LTN, as the genre had now become something that in 
certain circumstances the public might actually believe. Thus, it was dangerous, and this spurred 
its retreat toward naïve empiricism and its conclusion. 
 
Hans Pfaall--A Tale (1840): The Effects of the Moon Hoax on the Genre  
One may discern the effects of Locke’s Moon Hoax on the LTN genre by comparing two 
different editions of Edgar Allan Poe’s Hans Pfaall--A Tale. Originally published in 1835 three 
weeks before Locke’s Moon Hoax, Poe’s story was re-released in an edited form in 1840, after 
the hoax had occurred. In the 1835 version previously discussed, Poe uses certain textual features 
to generate epistemic complexity, but in the 1840 version he removes some of these elements in 
order to reduce this complexity and its accompanying instability. This marks a movement in 
LTNs away from indeterminate texts that satirize scientific discourse’s false association with true 
content toward the genre’s quarantine within modern science fiction, a genre that relies on those 
associations and categories going unchallenged. This shift becomes increasingly relevant in light 
of a coeval trend in the scientific community toward organizational schemes that foreground 
clear-cut categorization, exemplified by Linnaeus’s Systema Naturae. One can view these 
schemes as reprising the Royal Society’s binary perspective, as they left no room for the 
indeterminacy lunar travel narratives relied upon. The rest of this chapter will present this 
movement away from categorically defiant indeterminacy back towards the categorical clarity of 




The revised version of Hans Pfaall removes slight critiques of scientific discourse, letting 
the discourse’s association with truth go unchallenged. For instance, in one passage present in 
the 1835 edition but missing in the 1840 edition, Hans Pfaall reminisces about his education in 
Natural Philosophy, and at one point wonders “whether…profundity itself might not, in matters 
of a purely speculative nature, be detected as a legitimate source of falsity and error” (Poe 332). 
Considering how overblown Pfaall’s scientific discourse becomes in the interest of fooling his 
audience, one may detect in these words a subtly ironic critique. The 1840 edition removes this 
critical passage, streamlining the narrative so that it only satirizes naïve characters and pins no 
blame whatsoever on scientific discourse’s false associations with true content. 
 Poe’s most obvious changes to the story appear in its final lines. He simplifies the text’s 
epistemic claims by removing the narrator’s dismissal of evidence raised against Pfaall’s 
account. First, Poe omits the narrator’s remarks that follow each piece of evidence as it is 
presented: “Don’t understand at all,” “He was mistaken—undoubtedly—mistaken,” “Well—
what of it” and “Don’t believe it—don’t believe a word of it” (341). He then removes the 
paragraph that ends the original 1835 version on a note of emphatic belief, reproduced below: 
 
The d----l, you say! Now that’s too bad. Why, hang the [naysayers], they should 
be prosecuted for a libel. I tell you gentlemen, you know nothing of the business. 
You are ignorant of Astronomy—and of things in general. The voyage was 
made—it was indeed—and made, too, by Hans Pfaal. I wonder, for my part, you 
do not perceive at once that the letter—the document—is intrinsically—is 
astronomically true—and that it carries upon its very face the evidence of its own 
authenticity. (Poe 341) 
 
By omitting the ending in which the narrator contests evidence against Pfaall’s account, Poe 
simplifies his tale. The reader need not actively oppose the narrator’s view at the end of the 




demonstrated and its place as fiction clearer to the audience. This illuminates a preference for 
clear-cut categorization in issues of fact and fiction instead of complex indeterminacy. 
 Poe also appends to his 1840 edition of Hans Pfaall a “Note” that responds directly to 
Locke’s Moon Hoax. He insists that while both stories “have the character of hoaxes,” “both 
hoaxes are on the same subject, the moon” and “both attempt to give plausibility by scientific 
detail,” crucial differences separate the two texts. Poe asserts that Hans Pfaall is written “in a 
tone of banter,” while Locke’s hoax is “downright earnest,” and also complains that “[h]owever 
rich the imagination displayed in [Locke’s] ingenious fiction, it wanted much of the force which 
might have been given it by a more scrupulous attention to facts and to general analogy” (103). 
Clearly, Poe imagines the LTN as entirely reliant upon, not critical of, verisimilar scientific 
discourse, not challenging the assumed connection it appears to have with true content.  
Poe emphasizes this view by reviewing extant LTNs against a standard of verisimilitude. 
Godwin’s he says is “a singular and somewhat ingenious little book,” and that “notwithstanding 
the blunders italicized [in a preceding quotation] the book is not without some claim to attention, 
as affording a naïve specimen of the current astronomical notions of the time” (Poe 106, 108). In 
contrast to this, Poe calls de Bergerac’s satire “utterly meaningless,” and alludes to an allegorical 
fiction whose “means of the voyage are more deplorably ill” (Poe 108). Poe concludes his Note 
by clarifying this requirement of verisimilitude: 
 
In [previous LTNs] the aim is always satirical…In none, is there any effort at 
plausibility in the details of the voyage itself. The writers seem, in each instance, 
to be utterly uninformed in respect to astronomy. In “Hans Pfaall” the design is 
original, inasmuch as regards an attempt at verisimilitude, in the application of 
scientific principles (so far as the whimsical nature of the subject would permit,) 




Poe’s analysis demonstrates a preference for the verisimilar detail characteristic of naïve 
empiricism without the critique figured by satires’ use of fictional elements, which often results 
in indeterminate texts. Poe prefers his fiction to make use of scientific discourse’s connotations 
without critique, a stance which becomes characteristic of the genre of science fiction. While one 
may argue that Poe’s is only one biased opinion, we may take it as indicative of the times not 
only due to his familiarity with the LTN genre, but also because his preference for uncritical, 
naïve empiricist use of scientific discourse is directly visible in the works of Jules Verne.  
 
Jules Verne: “Science” and “Fiction”  
In this last section, I will briefly consider Jules Verne’s From the Earth to the Moon 
Direct in Ninety-Seven Hours and Twenty Minutes, and a Trip Round It. Originally published as 
two French novels, De la Terre à la Lune [From the Earth to the Moon] (1865) and Autour de la 
Lune [Around the Moon] (1870), this work attests to the conclusion of the epistemically 
complex, satirical, and indeterminate genre of the LTN. As I have shown, 18th-century LTNs use 
satirical critiques to undermine the reliability of scientific discourse and question its culturally 
stable association with fact. I posit Verne’s texts as the conclusion of this genre’s development 
because they do none of these things. Instead, they treat the trope of lunar travel in a way that 
returns to LTNs’ initial trend of naïve empiricism. These texts represent the endgame of 
untroubled categories of fact and fiction that characterize present-day cultural thought. 
While this text is satirical, it returns to using scientific discourse as an instrument rather 
than a target of satire, not acknowledging the effect of harshly satirical LTNs but returning to 




Baltimore Gun Club as extremely empirical, to the point of illogical behavior: the Club enjoys 
the Civil War, “[feeling] justly proud when the despatches [sic] of a battle returned the number 
of victims at tenfold the quantity of the projectiles expended,” but it sorrows at the “sad and 
melancholy day!” on which peace is declared (3). Similarly, Verne’s narrator reports that “[t]he 
estimation in which these gentlemen were held, according to one of the most scientific exponents 
of the Gun Club, was ‘proportional to the masses of their guns, and in direct ratio of the square 
of the distances attained by their projectiles’” (4). While the quotation openly declares scientific 
discourse to be at work, the discourse’s plausibility and association with fact are not undermined. 
Instead, the discourse is used as a satirical barb aimed at the Gun Club.  
While the Gun Club is satirized, its enterprise to fire a manned projectile to the moon is 
not. When the Club writes to the Cambridge Observatory asking its astronomers for calculations 
pertinent to the success of this endeavor, the Observatory provides the following answer to the 
question “Is it possible to transmit a projectile up to the moon?”: 
Yes; provided it possess an initial velocity of 1200 yards per second; calculations 
prove that to be sufficient. In proportion as we recede from the earth the action of 
gravitation diminishes in the inverse ratio of the square of the distance; that is to 
say, at three times a given distance the action is nine times less. Consequently the 
weight of a shot will decrease, and will become reduced to zero at the instant that 
the attraction of the moon exactly counterpoises that of the earth; that is to say, at 
47/52 of its passage… (Verne 20) 
The observatory’s response reprises familiar elements of scientific discourse, including jargon 
and quantitative data. No satire undercuts the discourse’s presumed association with truth. And, 
unlike in Hans Pfaall and Locke’s Moon Hoax, the discourse is never revealed to be a hoax; 




Instead of undercutting the seriousness of scientific discourse, Verne emphasizes it when 
he places the characters’ lives at stake over the accuracy of the aforementioned calculations in an 
episode referred to as “the incident of the algebra” (186). When one character demonstrates 
algebra to another en route to the moon, an example calculation yields different results than the 
Observatory’s math. This realization elicits a dramatic response: the characters cry “The deuce!” 
and “The devil!” and make “gesture[s] of despair” while lamenting, “we shall fall back upon the 
earth!” (Verne 183-184). The reliability conveyed by the Observatory’s scientific discourse here 
becomes an issue of life and death. Verne segues into a tense, serious scene in which one 
character takes measurements to confirm the calculation: 
Barbicane…after a rapid glance at the captain, took a pair of compasses 
wherewith to measure the angular distance of the terrestrial globe…Then rising 
and wiping his forehead, on which large drops of perspiration were standing, he 
put some figures on paper….[Nicholl] watched him anxiously. (185-186) 
 
Luckily, the characters discover that Cambridge Observatory erred in its initial calculations. If 
these calculations or the discourse in which they were presented had been the subject of satirical 
critique, this scene would not be able to sustain its overt dramatic tension.  
Verne’s text represents more than a regression to gestures used by LTNs written before 
they grew self-reflexive and satirized scientific discourse. It also attests to the waning of the 
genre of such critical LTNs by demonstrating in numerous ways that the perception of fact and 
fiction as mutually exclusive categories has solidified in popular culture. For example, this 
categorization is reflected in the differing modes of Verne’s chapters. The sole function of 
certain chapters in From the Earth to the Moon is to provide background information on topics 
pertinent to the narrative. For instance, when the Gun Club decides it will launch a projectile to 




discounting previous legends about the moon in the interest of distilling facts relevant to the 
story (Verne 23). A later chapter on the same theme is titled “Fancy and Reality,” more overtly 
demonstrating the mutually exclusive manner in which the text perceives fact and fiction (Verne 
232). This use of separate expository and narrative chapters is made possible by the distance a 
third-person narrator provides. Unlike in previous LTNs which were characterized by their use of 
a first-person participant narrator, Verne’s narrator is distanced from the story he tells and can 
pause his narrative to deliver information. Yet the fiction of the narrative and the presumed 
facticity of the discursive histories coexist without devolving into confusion and satire. The 
fiction does not undercut the pretensions of the scientific discourse used in the discursive 
sections, as it is a culturally stable construct by now that has become relatively unassailable.  
  While fictional elements occur throughout the text, they are distanced from the tale at 
hand and always clearly marked as fictional. For instance, during the speech where he announces 
the Club’s lunar project, the President of the Gun Club provides a history of “imaginary 
journeys” to the moon, specifically mentioning Godwin’s, de Bergerac’s, Locke’s, and Poe’s 
(Verne 12). However, he closes by asserting that “[Poe’s] journey, like all the previous ones, was 
purely imaginary” (Verne 12-13). In this “purely,” one can identify a preference for clear-cut 
categories of fact and fiction reminiscent of the Royal Society’s. Where other LTNs treated 
elements from previous works as at least plausible, Verne distances himself from the fictionality 
of previous LTNs in an attempt to bolster the verisimilitude of his own story. Similarly, the 
characters later hypothesize that because of the moon’s weaker gravity, the lunarians they might 
meet should be proportionally tiny - only about one foot high. At this a more theatrical character 
exclaims, “Lilliputians!” and declares, “I shall play the part of Gulliver. We are going to realize 




engages with fiction, but again clearly marks its reference as a fable with its rhetoric (“play the 
part of”) and clear-cut genre categorization (“fable”).5  Able to reference fictions without 
contaminating its association with fact, Verne’s text shows a stable fact-fiction binary at work. 
However, aspects of Verne’s speculation are incorrect, such as his portrayal of a single 
moment of weightlessness that occurs as characters “pass the neutral line” between earthly and 
lunar gravity (217). Verne’s narrator’s report of this moment divides fact from fiction as clearly 
as the line is thought to divide earthly from lunar gravity: “Fancy has depicted men without 
reflection, others without shadow. But here reality, by the neutralization of attractive forces, 
produced men in whom nothing had any weight, and who weighed nothing themselves” (217).  
This moment attests to the differences between Verne’s text and any previous LTN. It 
demonstrates that the end result of the LTN is that its disruptive critiques are quarantined within 
the emergent genre of science fiction and the simple, untroubled categorization of fiction and 
fact that it relies upon, as distinct as “fancy” and “reality” in the above quotation. This genre 
adheres to the principles of naïve empiricism and by doing so, becomes “science fiction,” a 
coexistence of two determined categories, instead of inhabiting the strange indeterminate space 
between them as previous LTNs do. However, one must realize that this binary interpretation of 
fact and fiction, like Verne’s “neutral line,” is not always an accurate perception, a conclusion to 
which indeterminate LTNs attest. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Readers will likely wonder what bearing Gulliver’s Travels has on LTNs, and vice versa. While the 
scope of this project cannot accommodate a full analysis of this correspondence, it should suffice to 
recognize that both Swift’s novel and many LTNs are satires that critique travel narratives by having a 
narrator claim to travel to overtly fictional worlds, contrasting verisimilitude and frank fictionality in 
order to amplify their critiques. Similarly, “among [Gulliver’s Travels’s] targets is what we have come to 





 In the preceding investigation of fact and fiction, I have examined both the rise and fall of 
the lunar travel narrative (LTN) as well as the ways in which it raises difficult epistemological 
questions about the relationship between writing and belief. Considering the complete trajectory 
of the genre invites yet more questions. How exactly are the LTN, science fiction, and the novel 
related? Did the LTN’s categorical multiplicity end with the genre, or have different forms of 
writing inherited it?  And does LTNs’ cyclical use of discourse to reveal the failings and 
falsehoods intrinsic to discourse retain significance centuries after these texts were written? 
Regarding the relationship between the three genres, one may note that science fiction, 
like the novel, is implicit where the LTN is explicit. As I have demonstrated, the LTN is a 
confrontational genre. It forces readers to confront paradoxes and contradictions by locating 
them upon the surface of the text with sharp opposition between form and content. As a result, it 
actively disrupts its readers’ suspension of disbelief and forces them to struggle with the critiques 
that its paradoxes and contradictions raise. However, where the LTN shows its hand, science 
fiction and the novel do not. Neither science fiction nor the novel are confrontational genres; 
each keeps its contradictions implicit. Since each genre’s hidden paradoxes do not take the form 
of differences between a text’s form and content, readers can suspend disbelief without 
interruption. After all, according to Gallagher, the novel “is said both to have discovered and to 
have obscured fiction” (338, emphasis mine), and science fiction attempts to similarly obscure 
the fictionality of its invented elements through the use of scientific discourse and its 
associations with truth. So, in investigating the challenge the LTN represents to received 
categorization, my analysis could necessary only treat science fiction in a closing gesture, as the 




If science fiction is not the natural inheritor of LTNs’ categorical curiosity, what forms of 
writing are? The postmodern novel, with its opposition to a single “true” version of objective 
reality, has perhaps inherited LTNs’ impulse to defy received categorization, transforming a 
genre’s implicit paradoxes into explicit ones in the process. One may also view LTNs in 
conjunction with the propensity for contemporary political discourse to obfuscate categories 
when convenient. And perhaps the Internet’s digital culture and virtual environments are in the 
process of defining another moment in which discourse is complicating categories and 
influencing epistemology. More research is needed to see the implications of categorical 
complication in each of these areas, but it is likely that they each form part of a genealogy that 
includes the LTN. 
Challenges to received categorization continue, perhaps because the discursive 
associations that formed them – and that the LTN explicitly challenged – are still at work today. 
For example, readers of this thesis are likely to believe it due in part to the way I have presented 
it; I have adhered to a certain academic discourse with its own jargon (“binary paradigm”) and 
even coined a few terms of my own (“LTN”).  While I did not consciously intend my discourse 
to carry my argument, in retrospect I realize that it too attests to the persuasion and endurance of 
discursive associations. We are living in the world that resulted from the discursive soup of the 
18th century crystallizing into convenient categories, but the LTN stands as proof that these 
categories were not – and perhaps are not – as neat as we now perceive them.  
While the features of LTNs are at times delightfully archaic, their critiques of the power 
that discourse carries are still relevant and powerful, perhaps uncomfortably so. Let us return to 




that there is no evidence of a direct link between Baghdad and some [discussed] terrorist 
organizations,” Rumsfeld deflects the point with his now-famous quotation: 
Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, 
because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we 
know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are 
some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones 
we don't know we don't know. And if one looks throughout the history of our 
country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the 
difficult ones. (“Defense.gov”) 
 
Instead of explicitly opposing the reporter and arguing that the reports he cites are incorrect, 
Rumsfeld takes the received categories of “known” and “unknown” – an explicit binary – and 
doubles them to create another dimension of complexity. In this schema, reports of no evidence 
are made suspect by “unknown unknowns,” an idea which implicitly suggests that there is 
evidence available that we have not yet discovered. Here, we see a perfect example of 
contemporary political discourse’s previously mentioned tendency to complicate received 
categories of fact and fiction. Such doublespeak functions by defining new epistemic categories 
and schemas where convenient and demonstrates that the influence that discourse has on 
perceptions of fact and fiction – that LTNs identified – is still at work today. 
Further investigation into how literary discourse interacts with and influences those of 
other fields will help to shed light on the chaotic and complex evolution of discourse over time, 
especially as these discourses continue to interact in strange and wonderful ways. The word 
“boojum” exemplifies such an interaction. Originally coined in a literary work, Lewis Carroll’s 
The Hunting of the Snark, “boojum” has since been adopted by particle physicists to describe a 
phenomenon in superfluids that makes a supercurrent “softly and suddenly vanish away” (Carroll 




makes it hard to deny that the languages of literature and science interact. Exploring the history 
of this interaction may provide further insight into how the fields came to be perceived as 
opposing each other in mutually exclusive, binary fashion. 
Delving into other curiosities that emerge from the literary climate of the long 18th 
century promises to further illuminate the roots of today’s culture. We should not rest upon our 
perception of fact and fiction or even the tenets of epistemology – perhaps some of the sturdiest 
tenets we have – as received, but rather question them and learn their histories. This will allow us 
to understand not only what we think, but how we think – the content of our thoughts and the 
systems through which our thinking takes place, the implicit mechanisms at work in the ways we 



















Adams, Percy G. Travel Literature and the Evolution of the Novel. Lexington, Kentucky: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1983. Print. 
Atkinson, Dwight. Scientific Discourse in Sociohistorical Context: The Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 1675-1975. Routledge, 1998. Print. 
Bacon, Francis. New Atlantis. Clarendon Press, 1915. Google Books. Web. 30 Jan. 2013. 
<http://books.google.com/books?id=ieXrK6lXaPYC>. 
Barker, Peter Frederick. From the Scamander to Syracuse. Studies in Ancient Logistics. Diss. 
University of South Africa, 2005. Web. 16 Oct. 2012. 
<http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/1740/00dissertation.pdf?sequence=2>. 
Barthes, Roland. "From Science to Literature." The Rustle of Language. Ed. and trans. Richard 
Howard. University of California Press, 1989. 3-10. Google Books. Web. 4 Dec. 2012. 
<http://books.google.com/books?id=qj_Qe3aaItUC>. 
Behn, Aphra. “The Emperor of the Moon.” The Works of Aphra Behn, Volume III. Ed. Montague 
Summers. 2003. 335–401. Web. 25 Nov. 2012. 
<http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/10039>. 
Bennett, Maurice J. “Edgar Allan Poe and the Literary Tradition of Lunar Speculation (Edgar 
Allan Poe Et La Tradition Littéraire De Spéculation Sélénite).” Science Fiction Studies 
10.2 (1983): 137–147. Web. 25 Jan. 2013. 





Boyle, Robert. General Heads for the Natural History of a Country Great Or Small: Drawn Out 
for the Use of Travellers And Navigators. [Ann Arbor, Mich.]: Early English Books 
Online Text Creation Partnership, 2005. Web. 12 Jan. 2013. 
Bozzetto, Roger. “Kepler’s ‘Somnium’; Or, Science Fiction’s Missing Link (‘Le Songe’ De 
Kepler, Ou Le Chaînon Manquant De La Science Fiction).” Ed. and trans. Arthur B. 
Evans. Science Fiction Studies 17.3 (1990): 370–382. Web. 16 Jul. 2013. 
Brody, Selma B. “The Source and Significance of Poe’s Use of Azote in ‘Hans Pfaall’ (L’origine 
Et La Signification De L’utilisation De ‘L’azote’ Dans ‘Hans Pfaall’ De Poe).” Science 
Fiction Studies 17.1 (1990): 60–63. Web. 24 Jan. 2013. 
Brunt, Samuel. A Voyage to Cacklogallinia: With a Description of the Religion, Policy, Customs 
and Manners, of That Country. London: Printed by J. Watson, 1727. Web.  28 Jun. 2012. 
<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/16202/16202-h/16202-h.htm>. 
Campbell, Mary Baine. “Impossible Voyages: Seventeenth-Century Space Travel and the 
Impulse of Ethnology.” Literature and History 6.2 (1997): 1-18. Web. 16 Jul. 2012. 
---. “Speedy Messengers: Fiction, Cryptography, Space Travel, and Francis Godwin’s The Man 
in the Moone.” The Yearbook of English Studies 41.1 (2011): 190–204. Web. 16 Jul. 
2012. 
---. “Travel Writing and Its Theory.” The Cambridge Companion to Travel Writing. Ed. Peter 
Hulme & Tim Youngs. Cambridge University Press, 2002. 261–278. Google Books. 






Capoferro, Riccardo. Empirical Wonder: Historicizing the Fantastic, 1660-1760. Peter Lang, 
2010. Print. 
Cartwright, John, and Brian Baker. Literature and Science: Social Impact and Interaction. Santa 
Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2005. Science and Society. Print. 
Chen-Morris, Raz. “Shadows of Instruction: Optics and Classical Authorities in Kepler’s 
‘Somnium’.” Journal of the History of Ideas 66.2 (2005): 223–243. Web. 27 Jun. 2012. 
Copeland, David A. “A Series of Fortunate Events: Why People Believed Richard Adams 
Locke’s ‘Moon Hoax’.” Journalism History 33.3 (2007): 140. Web. 27 Jun. 2012. 
Cressy, David. “Early Modern Space Travel and the English Man in the Moon.” The American 
Historical Review 111.4 (2006): 961–982. Web. 9 Jan. 2013. 
Dear, Peter. “Totius in Verba: Rhetoric and Authority in the Early Royal Society.” Isis 76.2 
(1985): 145–161. Web. 8 Oct. 2012. 
De Bergerac, Cyrano. A Voyage to the Moon. Doubleday and McClure Co., 1899. Ed. Curtis 
Hidden Page. Trans. Archibald Lovell. Google Books. Web. 28 Jan. 2013. 
<http://books.google.com/books?id=OdlHAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gb
s_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false>. 
Defoe, Daniel. The Consolidator: or, Memoirs of Sundry Transactions from the World in the 
Moon. Translated from the Lunar Language, by the Author of The True-Born English 
Man. London, 1705. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. University of 







Dewald, Carolyn. Introduction. The Histories. By Herodotus. Trans. Robin Waterfield.  2008. 
Reprint. Oxford [England]; New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Print. 
De Veil, Hans, and Jonathan Swift. An Essay Towards a Solution of the Horizontal Moon. 
Northampton [Eng.]: Printed by W. Dicey, 1723. Hathi Trust Digital Library. Web. 28 
Jun. 2012. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015078575464>. 
 “Directions for Observations and Experiments to Be Made by Masters of Ships, Pilots, and 
Other Fit Persons in Their Sea-Voyages.” Philosophical Transactions 2.23-32 (1666): 
433–448. Web. 1 Oct. 2012. < http://rstl.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/2/23-
32/433.full.pdf+html>. 
"empiricism, n.". OED Online. December 2012. Oxford University Press. 12 Dec. 2012. 
<http://www.oed.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/view/Entry/61344?redirectedFrom=empiricis
m>. 
"fathom, n.". OED Online. December 2012. Oxford University Press. 12 Dec. 2012. 
<http://www.oed.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/view/Entry/68519?rskey=gBZPh8&result=1&
isAdvanced=false>. 
Galilei, Galileo. Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1957. 
Doubleday Anchor Books, A94. Print. 




Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. 336–363. Print. 
Godwin, Francis. The Man In the Moon, 1638. Menston, Eng.: Scolar Press, 1971. Print. 
Graves, William. Introduction. The Female Critick; or, Letters in Drollery from Ladies to Their 
Humble Servants, Anonymous. Iter Lunare; or, A Voyage to the Moon, by David Russen. 
By David Russen. New York: Garland Pub., 1972. Foundations of the Novel. 5-9. Print.  
Hansson, Sven Ove. “Science and Pseudo-Science.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Winter 2012 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta. 2012. Web. 9 Feb. 2013. 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/pseudo-science/>. 
Hariot, Thomas. A Brief and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia. Ed. Paul Royster. 
Electronic Texts in American Studies. Paper 20. 1588. Web. 12 Dec. 2012. 
<http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/etas/20>. 
Herodotus. The Histories. Trans. Robin Waterfield. 2008. Reprint. Oxford [England]; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998. Print. 
"History of the Royal Society | Royal Society." The Royal Society: Welcome. N.p., n.d. Web. 9 
Mar. 2013. <http://royalsociety.org/about-us/history/>. 
Howgego, Raymond John. “Invented And Apocryphal Narratives of Travel From Ancient Egypt 
to the Present Day.” London: The Hakluyt Society, 2010. Print. 
Jordan, Mark Jerrid. "A Lexicon Technicum for This Present Age:" Scientific Satire in Defoe's 






Kepler, Johannes, and Edward Rosen. Kepler’s Conversation with Galileo’s Sidereal Messenger. 
New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1965. Print. 
---. Somnium; the Dream, or Posthumous Work on Lunar Astronomy. Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1967. Print. 
Lawton, H. W. “Bishop Godwin’s Man in the Moone.” The Review of English Studies 7.25 
(1931): 23–55. Web. 11 Dec. 2012. 
Lewis, R. “The Publication of John Wilkins’s ‘Essay’ (1668): Some Contextual Considerations.” 
Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 56.2 (2002): 133–146. Web. 28 Jan. 
2013. 
Linné, Carl von. Systema Naturae, 1735.: Facsimile of the First Edition. Nieuwkoop: De Graaf, 
1964. Systema Naturae. Print. 
Locke, John. "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding - John Locke – Google 
Books." Google Books. Web. 11 Apr. 2012. 
<http://books.google.com/books?id=vjYIAAAAQAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage
&q&f=false>. 
Locke, Richard Adams. The Celebrated “Moon Story”, Its Origin and Incidents; with a Memoir 
of the Author, and an Appendix, Containing, I. An Authentic Description of the Moon; II. 
A New Theory of the Lunar Surface in Relation to That of the Earth. Eds William N. 
Griggs and J. N. Nicollet. New York: Bunnell and Price, 1852. Print. 
Lucian. Lucian’s True History. Ed. Francis Hickes & Charles Whibley. London: A. H. Bullen, 





MacPhail, Eric. “Cyrano’s Machines: The Marvelous and the Mundane in L’Autre Monde.” 
French Forum 18.1 (1993): 37–46. Web. 24 Jan. 2013. 
Malthus, Francis, and Thomas Cecil. A Treatise of Artificial Fire-vvorks Both for Vvarres and 
Recreation with Divers Pleasant Geometricall Obseruations, Fortifications, and 
Arithmeticall Examples: In Fauour of Mathematicall Students. [London]: Printed [by W. 
Jones] for Richard Havvkins, and are to be sold at his shop in Chancerie lane neere to 
Serieants Inne, 1629. Web. 12 Dec. 2012. 
< http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:image:10323>. 
McColley, Grant. “John Wilkins--A Precursor of Locke.” The Philosophical Review 47.6 (1938): 
642–643. Web. 28 Jan. 2013. 
McDermot, Murtagh. A Trip to the Moon: By Mr. Murtagh McDermot. Containing Some 
Observations And Reflections, Made by Him During His Stay In That Planet, Upon the 
Manners of the Inhabitants. [London],  MDCCXXVIII. [1728]. Eighteenth Century 




McKeon, Michael. “Generic Transformation and Social Change: Rethinking the Rise of the 
Novel.” Theory of the Novel: a Historical Approach. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins 




---. “Histories of the Individual.” The Origins of the English Novel, 1600-1740. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1987. 90–118. Print. 
Mermin, N. David. “E Pluribus Boojum: The Physicist as Neologist.” Physics Today 34.4 
(1981): 46. Web. 11 Mar. 2013.  
Mezciems, Jenny. “‘’Tis Not to Divert the Reader’: Moral and Literary Determinants in Some 
Early Travel Narratives.” Prose Studies 5.1 (1982): 1–19. Print. 
Miller, David Marshall. "Galileo on the Moon: Seen and Unseen - Duke University." Duke 
University. Web. 13 Jan. 2013. 
<people.duke.edu/~dmmiller/.../Galileo%20On%20the%20Moon.pdf> 
Morris, Ralph. A narrative of the life and astonishing adventures of John Daniel, a smith at 
Royston in Hertfordshire, For a Course of seventy Years. Containing, The melancholy 
Occasion of his Travels. His Shipwreck with one Companion on a desolate Island. Their 
way of Life. His accidental discovery of a Woman for his Companion. Their peopling the 
Island. Also, A Description of a most surprising Engine, invented by his Son Jacob, on 
which he flew to the Moon, with some Account of its Inhabitants. His return, and 
accidental Fall into the Habitation of a Sea-Monster, with whom he lived two Years. His 
further Excursions in Search of England. His Residence in Lapland, and Travels to 
Norway, from whence he arrived at Aldborough, and further Transactions till his death, 
in 1711. Aged 97. Illustrated with several copper plates, engraved by Mr. Boitard. Taken 
from his own mouth, by Mr. Ralph Morris. London,  MDCCLI. [1751]. Eighteenth 







Newton, Isaac. Newton's Principia: The mathematical principles of natural philosophy (Google 
eBook). Ed. and trans. Andrew Motte. The New York Public Library: D. Adee, 1848. 
Web. 18 Feb. 2013. 
Nicolson, Marjorie Hope. Introduction. A Voyage to Cacklogallinia: With a Description of the 
Religion, Policy, Customs and Manners, of That Country.  By Samuel Brunt. London: 
Printed by J. Watson, 1727. Web. 28 Jun. 2012.  
---. Voyages to the Moon. New York: Macmillan Co., 1948. Print. 
Parrett, Aaron. The Translunar Narrative in the Western Tradition. Aldershot, Hampshire, 
England  ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004. Print. 
Patey, Douglas Lane. “Swift’s Satire on ‘Science’ and the Structure of Gulliver’s Travels.” ELH 
58.4 (1991): 809–839. Web. 23 Mar. 2013. 
Pearson, Lionel. “Credulity and Scepticism in Herodotus.” Transactions and Proceedings of the 
American Philological Association 72 (1941): 335–355. Web. 23 Jan. 2013. 
Philmus, Robert M. “Murder Most Fowl: Butler’s Edition of Francis Godwin.” Science Fiction 
Studies 23.2 (1996): 260–269. Web. 9 Jan. 2013. 
Poe, Edgar Allan. The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe. Volume 2. Ed. James Albert 




Poole, William. Introduction. The Man in the Moone. By Francis Godwin. Broadview Press, 
2009. 11–60. Print. 
Pratt, Mary Louise. “Science, Planetary Consciousness, Interiors.” Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing 
and Transculturation. London  ; New York: Routledge, 1992. 15–37. Print. 
Shapiro, Barbara. Introduction. Discovery of a World in the Moone. By John Wilkins. Scholars 
Facsimilies & Reprint, 1973. v–x. Print. 
Spenser, Edmund. Spenser: The Faerie Queene (re-issue). 2nd ed. Eds. A. C. Hamilton, Hiroshi 
Yamashita, Toshiyuki Suzuki, and Shohachi Fukuda. Longman, 2006. Print. 
Sprat, Thomas. "Thomas Sprat: The History of the Royal Society of London (excerpts)." The 
Broadview Anthology of Seventeenth-Century Verse & Prose.  Eds. Alan Rudrum, Joseph 
Laurence Black, and Holly Faith Nelson. Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2000. 
1080-1082. Web. 12 Dec. 2012. 
<http://books.google.com/books?id=eSMJzC8NcasC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_
ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false>. 
Steup, Matthias. “Epistemology.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition). 
Ed. Edward N. Zalta. Web. 22 Jan. 2013. 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/epistemology/>. 
St. Helena Tourism. "Early History · The Island · St. Helena." St. Helena. St. Helena Tourism, 
n.d. Web. 21 Feb 2013. <http://www.sthelenatourism.com/pages/early.html> 
Reed, Joel. “Restoration and Repression: The Language Projects of the Royal Society.” Studies 




Romanowski, Sylvie. “Cyrano De Bergerac’s Epistemological Bodies: ‘Pregnant with a 
Thousand Definitions’.” Science Fiction Studies 25.3 (1998): 414–432. Web. 16 Jul. 
2012. 
Russen, David. Iter Lunare or, a Voyage to the Moon. Containing Some Considerations on the 
Nature of That Planet. ... By David Russen of Hythe. // The Female Critick; or, Letters in 
Drollery from Ladies to Their Humble Servants, Anonymous. Iter Lunare; or, A Voyage 
to the Moon, by David Russen. New York: Garland Pub., 1972. Foundations of the Novel. 
Print. 
"Thomas Sprat, 1635-1713." The Norton Anthology of English Literature: Norton Topics Online. 
W.W. Norton and Company, 2010. Web. 12 Dec. 2012. 
<www.wwnorton.com/college/english/nael/noa/pdf/27636_17th_U38_Sprat-1-6.pdf>. 
United States Department of Defense. "Defense.gov News Transcript: DoD News Briefing - 
Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers." United States Department of Defense 
(defense.gov). Web. 12 Dec. 2012. 
<http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636>. 
"verisimilitude, n.". OED Online. December 2012. Oxford University Press. Web. 12 Dec. 2012 
<http://www.oed.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/view/Entry/222523?redirectedFrom=verisimil
itude>. 
Verne, Jules. From the Earth to the Moon Direct in Ninety-seven Hours and Twenty Minutes, 





Walsh, Lynda. The Rhetoric of the Scientific Media Hoax: Humanist Interventions in the 
Popularization of Nineteenth-Century American Science. Diss. The University of Texas 
at Austin, 2003. Web. 2 Feb. 2013. <http://hdl.handle.net/2152/1035>. 
Watt, Ian P. The Rise of the Novel; Studies in Defoe, Richardson, and Fielding. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1957. Print. 
Wilkins, John. The Discovery of a World in the Moone, Or, A Discovrse Tending To Prove That 
'Tis Probable There May Be Another Habitable World In That Planet. 1638. London, 
Printed by E. G. for Michael Sparl and Edward Forrest. 23 Aug 2006. Web. 12 Aug. 
2012. <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/19103/19103-h/19103-h.htm>. 
---.  A Discourse Concerning a New World & Another Planet in 2 Bookes. Ed. William Marshall 
& Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. 1640. [Ann Arbor, Mich.]: 
Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership, 2004. Discovery of a World in 
the Moone. Web. 28 Jan. 2013. <http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A15364.0001.001>. 
 
 
 
